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THE SOVEREIGN NATION OF BASEBALL: WHY FEDERAL
LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO "AMERICA'S GAME"
AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY
MITCHELL NATHANSON*
ABSTRACT:
This article examines the relationship between Major League
Baseball ("MLB") and the law; discussing how it has evolved that
MLB has become unofficially exempt from federal law on a wide
range of issues due to its unique status within American society.
Although its antitrust exemption is well-known, MLB has, in prac-
tice, not been subject to the forces of federal law in many other
contexts as well, setting it apart from most other corporations and
organizations - even other professional sports leagues such as the
NFL, NHL and NBA. As a result of the wide berth provided to MLB
by the federal courts and legislature, MLB has largely been free to
govern itself pursuant to its own definition of what is in "the best
interest of baseball" - denying its players even the most basic and
fundamental due process rights, arbitrarily punishing those it has
labeled as "rogue" owners, and willfully violating federal law that
has applied to it for decades in theory but not in practice, in the
process. From its inception in 1876 to the present, MLB has been,
in effect, an extra-judicial entity, a society unto itself, answerable to
no one in all but the most extreme circumstances. It is this atmos-
phere of de facto sovereignty that has led to the culture of corrup-
tion identified within the recently released Mitchell Report, which
beneath the fireworks over the names of the players identified
within the report, quietly and systematically details MLB's decades-
long disregard for federal law. Such disregard eventually provided
a fertile breeding ground for the corporate malfeasance that per-
mitted MLB to ignore both federal law and the overwhelming evi-
dence of illegal drug use taking place within its locker rooms and
to, in fact, encourage it throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In the
end, as the Mitchell Report highlights, in MLB it was the system
itself that was corrupt, with the identified players merely symptoms
of the problem, rather than the problem in and of themselves. This
article examines how things progressed to this point.
* Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 16, 2007, Barry Bonds - baseball's all-time home
run king - was indicted on four counts of perjury and one count of
obstruction of justice stemming from his federal grand jury testi-
mony in connection with the investigation of steroid use in sports in
general and, in Bonds' case, Major League Baseball in particular.'
Pursuant to the indictment, federal prosecutors alleged that Bonds
perjured himself when he denied ever knowingly having taken ster-
oids and human growth hormone, suspected performance-enhanc-
ing substances.2 This day was a long-time in coming, as the federal
investigation had dragged on for several months, with the much
anticipated and expected indictment the subject of much specula-
tion within the world of Major League Baseball ("MLB"). Now that
it had arrived, it was largely greeted with cheers from the com-
mentariat: The New York Times hailed it as "A Good Day for Base-
ball," promising that, as a result of the official ferreting out of
Bonds, "A Better One Looms" in the future.3
Very quickly, Bonds was vilified - compared to other high pro-
file, recently-ousted liars such as entertaining magnate Martha Stew-
art and government official I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Jr.,4 - and
portrayed as an outlier: an immoral cog in an otherwise righteous
wheel. In fact, the very indictment itself was perceived as an indica-
tion of the integrity of the system: it may have its flaws, but it even-
tually identified and spit out the wrongdoers. A couple of months
later, in Januiary, 2008, star shortstop Miguel Tejada found himself
in much the same position as Bonds, Stewart and Libby, when he
too was investigated for perjury in conjunction with his testimony
regarding steroid use to a Congressional committee. 5 In all of
these examples, Americans could take solace in the idea that re-
gardless of the ugly facts involved in these cases, evil was rooted out.
In the end, the system worked.
Bonds and Tejada, however, were not the lone outliers. On
December 13, 2007, another event much anticipated in the world
1. See Dave Anderson, A Good Day for Baseball, And a Better One Looms, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at Sports Sunday 11.
2. See Id.
3. Id.
4. See Alan Schwarz, Prosecution's Best Pitch Is Precision, Experts Say, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 17, 2007 ("Bonds's situation and Libby's situation are particularly similar, in
regard to the denials of any kind of wrongdoing, " according to Peter Keane, a
professor at Golden Gate University School of Law).
5. See Alan Schwarz, Justice Department Asked to Investigate Tejada, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2008 (reporting Tejada may have lied to House committee in 2005).
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of Major League Baseball took place: the release of "The Mitchell
Report."6 In the report, former United States Senator George
Mitchell, acting upon the request of MLB commissioner Bud Selig,
identified dozens of other players who had taken steroids and other
suspected performance-enhancing substances in violation of fed-
eral law over the past several years. Upon its release, baseball had,
in the eyes of Selig, closed a chapter: the outliers were identified,
perhaps they would be reprimanded, and baseball had been
cleansed. "This report is a call to action," Selig said as he rose his
right index finger during the press conference in connection with
the release of the Report, "[a] nd I will act."7 Once again, the sys-
tem, despite its flaws, ultimately worked. The integrity of MLB re-
mained intact.
Or so the story goes.
Buried beneath the fireworks over the names of the players
identified within the Mitchell Report was the true dynamite:
namely, a detailed history of the decades-long disregard for federal
law on behalf of Major League Baseball. This willful dismissal of
the law was on display, as noted by Mitchell in his report, even in
Selig's charge to Mitchell upon handing the investigation over to
him. As noted within the report, Selig appointed Mitchell to con-
duct an investigation:
[T] o determine, as a factual matter, whether any Major
League players associated with [the Bay Area Laboratory
Co-Operative] or otherwise used steroids or other illegal
performance enhancing substances at any point after the
substances were banned by the 2002-2006 collective bar-
gaining agreement.8
Selig, however, also permitted Mitchell to "expand the investi-
gation and to follow the evidence wherever it may lead," if he felt it
necessary to do so. 9 Mitchell took Selig's opening and ran with it,
6. GeorgeJ. Mitchell, Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Indepen-
dent Investigation Into the Illegal Use Of Steroids and Other Performance En-
hancing Substances By Players in Major League Baseball [hereinafter Mitchell
Report] (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.primerahora.com/XStatic/
primerahora/docs/espanol/informemitchell4.pdf.
7. Bill Pennington, Selig Says Report 'Is a Call to Action'And Vows to Act Swiftly,
N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at D1.
8. Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting Press Release, MLB Officer of
Commissioner, Statement of Commissioner Allan H. Selig (Mar. 30, 2006)).
9. Id. (quoting Press Release, MLB Officer of Commissioner, Statement of
Commissioner Allan H. Selig (Mar. 30, 2006)). In his Report, Mitchell noted, "I
welcomed this latitude as necessary to ensure that my findings were reached in the
3
Nathanson: The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal Law Does Not Apply
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
52 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
producing a report that focused on MLB's historical indifference to
the pervasiveness of illegal performance enhancing drugs in its
locker rooms, and one which went well beyond Selig's 2002 start
date, generating a treatise that, in the end, most likely gave Selig
and MLB much more than they had bargained for.
The Mitchell Report destroyed the myth that Selig and MLB
had perpetrated for years: that MLB's signing of the 2002 collective
bargaining agreement along with the Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association (the "Players Association") somehow rendered 2002
as a starting point in the discussion of illegal drug use within the
game. By destroying that myth, the Mitchell Report invariably
shifted the focus of the blame for baseball's steroid crisis from
"rogue" players such as Bonds, Tejada and the others mentioned
within the Report, to MLB itself. By doing so, the Mitchell Report
showed that the proper comparison is not between these alleged
"outliers" and people like Stewart and Libby - individual malfea-
sance within the structure of a just system - but between MLB and
entities such as Enron and its compatriots - corporate malfeasance
amid a culture of corruption and a willful disregard for the law. As
such, as the Mitchell Report highlighted, in MLB it was the system
itself that was corrupt, with the identified players merely symptoms
of the problem rather than the problem in and of themselves.
This article examines how MLB got to this point by analyzing
the relationship between MLB and the law and showing that MLB
has historically been unofficially exempt from federal law on a wide
range of issues due to its unique stature within American society.
Although the antitrust exemption is well-known and has been much
written about, MLB has, in practice, not been subject to the forces
of federal law in many other contexts as well, setting it apart from
most other corporations and organizations - even other profes-
sional sports leagues.10 As a result of the wide latitude provided to
proper context and that I would not be required to request additional investigative
authority from the Commissioner once the investigation began." Id.
10. As the Bonds and Tejada indictments indicate, there is a difference be-
tween the applicability of federal law to MLB and to its players. Players have always
been subject to federal law when acting outside of the cocoon of MLB. Once en-
sconced within it, however, the cloak of immunity typically covers them as well - to
the extent that such immunity inures to the benefit of MLB. Indeed, Bonds was
only indicted through his alleged activities in connection with the Bay Area Labo-
ratory Co-Operative ("BALCO") - a San Francisco area laboratory not affiliated
with MLB and which was alleged to have supplied and injected him with illegal
steroids. Initially, the federal BALCO investigation targeted athletes not affiliated
with MLB (primarily track and field athletes) and Bonds became part of the inves-
tigation only when it became apparent that he too was a client. Tejada came under
scrutiny for activities outside the scope of MLB as well because of his testimony
[Vol. 16: p. 49
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MLB by the federal courts and legislature, MLB has largely been
free to govern itself pursuant to its own definition of what is in "the
best interests of baseball.""' From its inception in 1876 to the pre-
sent, MLB has been, in effect, an extra-judicial entity, a society unto
itself, answerable to no one in all but the most extreme
circumstances.
It is this atmosphere of de facto sovereignty that led to the cul-
ture of corruption identified within the Mitchell Report. Through
the years, as this article discusses, MLB has denied its players even
the most basic and fundamental due process rights without fear of
restraint, arbitrarily punished those it has labeled as "rogue" owners
and, as demonstrated in the Mitchell Report, willfully violated fed-
eral law that has applied to it for decades in theory although not, as
further demonstrated within the Report, in practice. As a result,
MLB has become a fertile ground for the willful violation of law by
players, owners and the office of the commissioner that has, ironi-
cally, finally called on Congress to apply federal law to it for the first
time - albeit on its own terms.
II. THE MITCHELL REPORT: MLB AS ENRON
A. The Mitchell Report
In his triumphant "call to arms" press conference, Selig's pos-
ture indicated that he had either misunderstood or willfully ig-
nored the true thrust of the Mitchell Report in that it was not the
naming of names that was most damning but, rather, the conclu-
sion that MLB should have taken action many years earlier. In its
"Summary and Recommendations," the Report concluded that Se-
before a Congressional committee in 2005 where he allegedly perjured himself.
See Michael S. Schmidt, Drug Test Results From 2003 Could Soon Be in Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2008, at Sports Sunday 1 (reporting that the federal government
plans to question one-hundred players who tested positive for performance-en-
hancing drugs in 2003). The results were supposed to be anonymous but, due to
the separate BALCO investigation, the names of some of the players became
known to the federal government which initially only sought information pertain-
ing to ten players. The government suspected that, like Tejada, these players had
perjured themselves before the BALCO grand jury. In the course of the investiga-
tion into BALCO's files, the names of all one hundred and four players who tested
positive became known. Without the BALCO investigation, it is likely that the ano-
nymity sought by MLB and the Players Association with regard to the testing would
have been honored by the federal government. The dichotomy of treatment by
federal courts and legislators of players and MLB is a relevant inquiry, but one that
is outside of the scope of this Article.
11. See Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409, 1416-17 (1990) (discussing freedom of Major
League Baseball to govern itself).
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lig's assumption that the signing of the 2002 Basic Agreement with
the Players Association was of particular relevance was "not accu-
rate." 2 Rather:
Beginning in 1971 and continuing today, Major League
Baseball's drug policy has prohibited the use of any pre-
scription medication without a valid prescription. By im-
plication, this prohibition applied to steroids even before
1991, when Commissioner Fay Vincent first expressly in-
cluded steroids in baseball's drug policy. Steroids have
been listed as a prohibited substance under the Major
League Baseball drug policy since then, although no
player was disciplined for steroid use before the prohibi-
tion was added to the collective bargaining agreement in
2002.13
Moreover, this prohibition was binding upon the players even
absent their express consent to it via a collectively bargained basic
agreement.14 As noted within the Report's historical review of base-
ball's drug policies in theory and in practice:
Many players were suspended for drug offenses before
2002, even though none of those suspensions related to
the use of steroids or other performance enhancing sub-
stances. Some suspensions were reduced in grievance ar-
bitrations brought by the Players Association, but no
arbitrator ever has questioned the authority of the Com-
missioner to discipline players for 'Just cause" based on
their possession, use, or distribution of prohibited drugs.
15
As referenced above, in 1991, Commissioner Vincent distrib-
uted a memorandum to all twenty six team owners, stressing that
baseball's drug policy expressly prohibited the use of "all illegal
drugs and controlled substances, including steroids or prescription
drugs for which the individual . . . does not have a prescription."
16
As such, under "baseball law," steroids had been banned, at least
implicitly, for decades. However, of even more relevance was fed-
12. Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at Summary and Recommendations (SR)
10.
13. Id. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
14. See Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at SR 11.
15. Id.
16. Memorandum from Francis T. Vincent, Jr., Institutional Affiliation to All
Major League Clubs Re: Baseball's Drug Policy and Prevention Program, at 2 (June
7, 1991); see also Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 41.
[Vol. 16: p. 49
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eral law, which, at least in theory, has always applied to baseball.
The distribution of prescription drugs of any sort by individuals
other than a duly licensed physician acting in furtherance of an
individual determination of a proper course of treatment has been
prohibited ever since the passing of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938.17 In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA") which created five "schedules" of con-
trolled substances subject to varying levels of penalties for misuse,
depending on, among other things, their potential for abuse.' 8 In
1988 the CSA was amended, making "the distribution of anabolic
steroids illegal unless: (1) it was done pursuant to the order of a
physician; and, (2) it was for the purpose of treating a disease."1 9 In
1990, the CSA was amended once again, pursuant to the Steroid
Control Act of 1990, which "imposed more stringent controls with
higher criminal penalties for offenses involving the illegal distribu-
tion of anabolic steroids and human growth hormone. That enact-
ment reclassified anabolic steroids as Schedule III controlled
substances, effectively raising penalties for their illegal possession
or distribution to levels similar to those applicable to narcotics." 20
Regardless of the reality that federal law now explicitly criminalized
the improper possession of steroids and human growth hormone,
MLB paid it little mind. As recalled by Vincent years later, "[m]y
memo was totally ignored by all .... The point was to alert the
baseball world to the recent inclusion of steroids as illegal prohib-
ited substances under federal law. But the union did nothing to
underscore my memo and I think the clubs ignored it as
irrelevant."2 1
In fact, the clubs' perception of the law, as well as of Vincent's
memo, was quite accurate. For all practical purposes, federal law
had been irrelevant to MLB for nearly a century by that point; there
was no reason to assume that the Steroid Control Act signaled any
such shift in this reality. Therefore, they were confident that they
not only could willfully ignore the mounting evidence of steroid
17. See FEDERAL FoOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIc ACT, PUB. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat
1040 (1938) (codified, as amended, at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (b)(1)(B) (2004)); see also
Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 18.
18. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970); see also Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 18-19.
19. Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 19 n.60 (quoting 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)).
20. See id. at 19-20; see also Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, 101 Stat. 4789 (1990).
21. Murray Chass, Mitchell Report Revealed Little Original Work, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2007, at D5.
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abuse within the game from the 1980s through the 1990s and into
the early 2000s, they could, in fact, reward the most blatant violators
of the law with large contracts in recognition of their inflated statis-
tical achievements attained, at least in some measure, through their
possession and use of Schedule III controlled substances in viola-
tion of the Steroid Control Act.22 As the Mitchell Report likewise
made plain, MLB's frequent refrain that it was unaware of the prob-
lem until the release of the Report itself was specious. The evi-
dence to the contrary, as noted in the Report, was overwhelming.
Before the Steroid Control Act was even passed, whispers of
steroid abuse within MLB were heard. In 1989, in a well-publicized
incident, Oakland A's slugger Jose Canseco was arrested for posses-
sion of a handgun in a Detroit airport. 23 Pursuant to the search
incident to the arrest, authorities discovered steroids.2 4 The next
year, Philadelphia Phillies centerfielder Lenny Dykstra arrived at
spring training carrying thirty pounds of newly-found bulk, which
he credited to the work of "real good vitamins." 25 In 1992, Boston
Globe columnist Peter Gammons reported that steroid abuse is
"much greater than anyone lets on."26 He further wondered if a
recent spate of injuries within the game could be attributed to ster-
oid abuse "as players' muscle mass becomes too great for their bod-
ies, resulting in the odd back and leg breakdowns . ".... 27 Los
Angeles Times and USA Today baseball writer Bob Nightengale was
likewise suspicious and made his suspicions known in 1995 in a se-
ries of articles emblazoned with headlines such as: "Baseball Still
Doesn't Get It," and "Steroids Become an Issue in Baseball: Many
Fear Performance-Enhancing Drugs Is Becoming Prevalent and Be-
lieve Something Must Be Done," with the latter article picked up by
wire services across the country and revised and reprinted in The
22. See Phil Sheridan, Baseball Turned a Blind Eye - and Saw Cash, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Nov. 18, 2007, at El.
23. See Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 63 (citing David Bush, Steroids Found
on Canseco's Friend Incident at Detroit Airport, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 22, 1989, at D1).
24. See id.
25. Id. at 66. Phillies general manager Lee Thomas suspected that Dykstra
abused performance-enhancing drugs but never pursued it beyond asking Dykstra
if he had used steroids. See id. Dykstra denied using them. See id. at 66-67. In
addition, Phillies trainerJeff Cooper stated that an unnamed player's use of ster-
oids was "obvious" and that he confronted Thomas with his suspicions. Id. at 67.
Thomas told Cooper to confront the player. See id. After the confrontation, the
player replied that it was none of Cooper's business and the matter was dropped.
See id.
26. Id. at 69.
27. Id. (citing Peter Gammon, They've Met Disappoint, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16,
1992, at 48).
[Vol. 16: p. 49
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Sporting News, historically considered "The Baseball Bible," a few
weeks later.28 In the updated article printed in The Sporting News,
steroid use was called "baseball's deep, dark, sinister secret."29
Regardless of these and other articles, MLB continued to pro-
fess ignorance. In all, the Mitchell Report cited eighty-five main-
stream media articles focusing on the use and abuse of steroids and
other performance enhancing substances within MLB between
1987 and 1998.30 Throughout this period, however, Selig repeated
his refrain, stating at one point that "[ilf baseball has a problem, I
must say candidly that we were not aware of it .... It certainly
hasn't been talked about much."3 1
By 2004, however, Selig's talking points were somewhat differ-
ent. By then, he professed that, even had he known of such abuse
within MLB, there was not much he could have done about it any-
way, due to the presence of the Players Association and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").32 Although he lauded the
toughened standards enacted within the world of amateur athletics,
he concluded that such standards were not viable within MLB due
to the presence of the Players Association and the constraints
placed upon MLB pursuant to the NLRA.33 Because drug testing
WdS LUMIIMUCIU d IIdo.LU ry SUUJI LLUk Ciiccuv IJcI1111 ¥J,
hands were, according to Selig, effectively tied.34 Specifically ad-
dressing the proliferation of "nutritional supplements" such as the
bottle of androstenedione found in Mark McGwire's locker in
1998,35 the only solution, he stressed, was for the federal govern-
ment to step in and ban or restrict unsafe nutritional supple-
ments.3 6 Selig stated:
28. Id. at 69-70.
29. Id. at 70 (quoting Bob Nightengale, Steroids in baseball? Say it ain't so, Bud.,
SPORTING NEWS, July 24, 1995, at 16).
30. Id. at Appendix C.
31. Id. at 71 (quoting Bob Nightengale, Steroids Becomes an Issue, Baseball:
Many Fear Performance-Enhancing Drug Is Becoming Prevalent and Believe Something
Must Be Done, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1995, at Cl).
32. See Allan H. "Bud" Selig & Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The Regulation of Nutri-
tional Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 35, 35-36 (2004)
(noting that players' NLRA membership complicates MLB's ability to implement
anti-drug policies).
33. See id. (predicting that after nutritional supplements are banned, MLB
will be able to establish better anti-drug policies).
34. See Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 67 n.200 (citing Stan Hochman,
Thomas: Blame Union, Not Phils, PHILA. DALLY NEWS, Mar. 16, 1991, at 45 ("We are
very concerned. But our hands are tied. We're handcuffed by the union.")).
35. Id. at 60.
36. See Selig & Manfred, supra note 32, at 48, 58-59 (urging Congress to sched-
ule harmful nutritional supplements as controlled substances).
9
Nathanson: The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal Law Does Not Apply
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
58 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Congress should not leave the regulation of nutritional
supplements to the collective bargaining processes of the
four major professional sports leagues . . . . Congress
should empower and encourage the Attorney General to
schedule certain harmful nutritional supplements as con-
trolled substances under the CSA... in order to return to
the hands of the FDA the power to effectively regulate nu-
tritional supplements before they arrive on store shelves
and in the hands of athletes. 37
Selig's recommendation was both ironic and hollow, particu-
larly given that in 1990 the federal government had done with re-
gard to steroids precisely what he was now recommending it do
with regard to nutritional supplements and MLB responded by will-
fully ignoring the law.
Regardless, as the Mitchell Report stressed, the issues relevant
to collective bargaining were ancillary to MLB's ability to control
the problem of substance abuse within the game and to enforce the
law. Rather, it was MLB's decision to disregard the law that led to
the culture of steroid abuse as personified by the game's greatest
slugger, Barry Bonds. The Report noted that although MLB,
through the Commissioner's Office, lacked the power to directly
issue warrants and subpoenas, it could conduct investigatory inter-
views and compel even union-represented employees, such as those
represented by the Players Association, to attend and answer truth-
fully.38 This "interview right" is one enjoyed by all employers in
order "to ensure that its rules are being followed."39 MLB, how-
ever, "rarely required" its players "to participate in investigatory in-
terviews regarding alleged performance enhancing substance
violations. ' 40 With regard to violations of federal law, the Report
found that MLB had been similarly non-compliant. The Report
noted that, if it wished, MLB could partner with state and federal
law enforcement agencies, which have both warrant and subpoena
power, and coordinate investigations through the indirect use of
these powers. 41 However, prior to the investigation undertaken by
Senator Mitchell, MLB made little use of this avenue. 42 In explor-
ing this avenue of investigation, the Report noted that "[o] ne law
37. Id. at 58-59.
38. See Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 290-91.
39. Id. at 292.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 290-91.
42. See id. at 290.
[Vol. 16: p. 49
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enforcement official advised us in frustration that there is no clearly
designed person in the Commissioner's Office to call when law en-
forcement does have information. ' 43 The Report does not indicate
why this is the case. It may, however, be for the simple reason that,
just like Commissioner Vincent's 1991 memo, those within MLB
have historically not wanted to know the substance of the informa-
tion potentially waiting for them on the other end of those calls.
Regardless, as the Mitchell Report made clear, the process of
undertaking an illegal drug possession investigation of a suspected
Major League player can and should be no different than investiga-
tions of employees in any other circumstance; the presence of the
Players Association is, ultimately, irrelevant. In any other walk of
life, the ability to conduct drug testing is not a prerequisite for un-
dertaking such a criminal investigation. Employers have always had
the ability to take reasonable steps to investigate, identify and rid
themselves of drug offenders operating within their employ. Tech-
nically, MLB is no different than any other work environment. Ex-
cept that, for some reason, MLB believes that it is.
In his response to the release of the Mitchell Report, Selig
lauded the numerous (twenty) recommendations contained within;
C~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~t _1 v..Cr.Avcsclin n'1L Li-6 I-Z-pw]' 1 111VCUd ~gL1011I
conduct background checks on clubhouse employees, cooperate
with federal and state law enforcement, and the like.44 He stated
that he would implement all of the recommendations that did not
require collective bargaining immediately. 45 However, as the Re-
port made clear, MLB, not unlike Dorothy in Oz, had all of these
powers at its disposal all along. Echoing his earlier plea for Con-
gress to regulate nutritional supplements, Selig likewise called on
Congress to classify Human Growth Hormone a Schedule III con-
trolled substance under the CSA,46 ignoring the fact that steroids
43. Id.
44. See id. at 285-306.
45. See Allan H. Selig, Commissioner, MLB, Statement Before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, at 9-10 (Jan 15, 2008).
46. See id. at 15.
I am here to ask for your assistance in this fight. The illegal use of per-
formance enhancing substances is a problem for Baseball - but it is a
social problem that extends beyond this sport or any sport. It is a societal
issue. Senator Mitchell's report identified the difficulties inherent in any
attempt, whether by Baseball, by other professional sports, or by the
Olympics, to stop by itself the use of illegal performance enhancing sub-
stances. We welcome your participation in attacking the problem at its
source. There are a number of bills that have been introduced that we
wholly support, including Representative Lynch's bill (HR 4911) and Sen-
ator Schumer's bill (Senate Bill 877) to make HGH a Schedule III Con-
11
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had been similarly classified a Schedule III controlled substance for
eighteen years by that point, to little effect. As such, despite Selig's
attempts to label the players identified within the Mitchell Report
as outliers, the Report showed that these players were merely the
symptoms of a larger problem: MLB itself. With corporate scandals
such as Enron and WorldCom still fresh, the release of the Mitchell
Report makes the comparison between MLB and these corruption
scandals both inevitable and appropriate.
B. Enron
In Enron, many commentators see "a textbook case of earnings
management" in the "active manipulation of accounting results for
the purpose of creating an altered impression of [the company]."47
For years, management hid debt, inflated profits and supported
stock prices that "considerably overstated the firm's value. '48 In the
end, before the scandal broke and its true image was revealed, En-
ron had succeeded in creating an erroneous, fictitious portrait of a
robust, thriving, company.49 Upon reflection, considerable evi-
dence existed throughout Enron's existence that should have led
analysts and regulators to question Enron's confident boasts
through the years; yet until management could no longer hide the
company's condition and its collapse was brought into public view,
few thought to challenge them. 50 Once out in the open, however, a
very different picture of the company emerged; a picture of a com-
pany run by executives who believed themselves to be above the
law, answerable to no one. As such, without the constraints placed
upon them by the legal system, they felt unencumbered and free to
massage the company's image so as to make it appear to be some-
thing it most certainly was not. In short, corporate malfeasance led
to a culture of active manipulation of results and ignorance of
counter-information that otherwise would have caused it to stop
trolled Substance, Senator Grassley's bill (Senate Bill 2470) to prohibit
the sale of DHEA to minors, and Senator Biden's bill (Senate Bill 2237)
to crackdown on the sale of controlled substances over the Internet.
Id.
47. Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, ENRON: A Finan-
cial Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1057, 1060-61 (2003) (quoting CHARLES W.
MuLoRD & EUGENE E. CoMIsKEY, THE FINANCIAL NUMBERS GAME: DETECTING CREA-
TIVE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES, 58-59 (2002)).
48. Id. at 1057.
49. See id. at 1076 (noting that Enron manipulated financial reports, creating
false impressions of financial health).
50. See id. at 1057, 1076 (explaining considerable evidence of Enron's finan-
cial trouble existed long before its ultimate ruin).
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and reevaluate its business strategy. In the end, it was not the
thousands of Enron employees who brought the company to bank-
ruptcy, it was the people at the top - the ones who created the
culture of deceit in which the company operated.
The release of the Mitchell Report cast a similar shadow upon
MLB. Upon its release, Selig's long-professed ignorance of the cul-
ture of steroid use in Major League locker rooms seemed silly and
his repeated assertions of helplessness in combating the problem
were ridiculous. Instead, like Enron, the Report made clear that it
was not the hundreds of players who brought MLB to this point, it
was MLB itself - the entity that perpetuated and thrived within a
similar culture of deceit. This revelation is, by itself, stunning. As
such, it is easy to see why Selig was so eager to respond to the Re-
port by immediately diverting the public's attention from this to the
litany of player names mentioned in the report, most notably that
of pitcher Roger Clemens.51 Such a diversion would avoid the most
difficult questions of all, namely, how did "America's Game" get to
this point? How did our national pastime become infected with
greed, corruption and deceit? How did baseball come to represent
not only America at its best but also at its worst? The remaining
sections of this Article attempt to answer these questions by examin-
ing the roots and development throughout the twentieth century of
MLB's extra-legal authority. As these sections will show, what
started benignly eventually turned malignant as MLB's de facto sov-
ereignty became more and more ingrained until, by the end of the
century, MLB could rightly believe that it had become something of
a nation unto itself, answerable to no one.
III. THE ROOTS OF MLB's EXTRA-LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. The Birth of the National League and the "Baseball Creed"
In order to understand the environment MLB existed within at
the turn of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to understand the
environment that brought MLB into existence over a century ear-
lier. As the nineteenth century turned toward the twentieth, the
importance of sport as something symbolic and representative of
other values began to take shape within the United States.52 This
was out of necessity. The Industrial Revolution - which offered em-
51. See Mitchell Report, supra note 6, at 167-75 (noting at length Clemens'
possible use of illegal performance enhancing substances).
52. See DANIEL A. NATHAN, SAYING IT'S So: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE BLACK
Sox SCANDAL, 36-37 (University of Illinois Press 2005) (explaining how economic
and social factors influenced changing definitions of masculinity).
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ployment to more and more men indoors, operating machines in
factories rather than working outside among the elements - com-
bined with the closing of America's frontier, profoundly challenged
this male-dominated society's values and determinants of social sta-
tus. 53 "With no frontier to conquer, with physical strength becom-
ing less relevant in work, and with urban boys being raised and
taught by women... it was feared that males were becoming 'soft,'
that society itself was becoming 'feminized.'- 54 As such, the defini-
tion of "manliness" itself was challenged and had to be redefined. 55
Soon, sports replaced work as the defining characteristic of manli-
ness. 56 In time, the ideology of athletic prowess as representative, of
manliness took hold. Boys were encouraged to engage in athletic
competition because sports, according to the evolving mantra of
the time, built strong character as well as bodies. 57 For the first
time, leisure activities were considered to be as important, if not
more so, than work. Now, it was sport that turned boys into
"healthy, respectable men," not field work.58
Baseball, which by the mid-point of the nineteenth century be-
gan to emerge as the most popular sport, was an immediate benefi-
ciary of this national mindset. For if sport contributed to
manliness, then no sport contributed to it more so than the na-
tion's most popular one. In time, a set of values emerged that be-
came synonymous with the game itself; a set of values that has since
become known as "the baseball creed."59 In essence, the creed held
that baseball contributed to individual and public welfare by "build-
ing manliness, character, and an ethic of success. '60 According to
the creed, the values supposedly taught by the game translated into
everyday life, as the virtues embodied by baseball could be used to
instill the proper values in the nation's youth as well as educate
53. See id. (highlighting dramatic economic and social changes "alter[ing] the
American social landscape").
54. Id. (quoting MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POWER AT PLAY SPORTS AND THE PRO-
LEM OF MASCULINITY 14 (Beacon Press 1992)).
55. Id.; see also BENJAMIN G. RADER, BASBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S GAME 36
(University of Illinois Press, 2d. ed. 2002) (noting that opportunities for public
displays of manliness had largely disappeared).
56. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 36-37.
57. See id. at 37 (noting holistic benefits of sports participation).
58. Id.
59. See Mitchell Nathanson, Gatekeepers of Americana: Ownership's Never-Ending
Quest for Control of the Baseball Creed, 15 NINE: A JOURNAL OF BASEBALL HISTORY &
CULTURE 68, 73 (2006) (explaining rise of baseball as embodiment of American
values).
60. STEPHEN A. REISS, TOUCHING BASE: PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL AND AMERICAN
CULTURE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 17 (University of Illinois Press 1999).
[Vol. 16: p. 49
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol16/iss1/2
2009] WHY FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT APPLY To BASEBALL 63
immigrants (which, by the late nineteenth century were streaming
into the country in unprecedented numbers) as to the American
way of life.6 1 Through the creed, baseball became elevated in sta-
tus. It went from a game played in one's off-hours to something
mystical and transformative. By the turn of the twentieth century, it
was believed by some that "being a true American and being a fan
are synonymous." 62 Baseball was now the national sport and "oc-
cup[ied] a niche just below belief in God and respect for
motherhood. 6 3
Unfortunately, America's game, as represented by the profes-
sional teams that emerged after the Civil War, and which had ini-
tially done much to spark communal pride in the teams now
representing the growing industrial cities in the Northeast and Mid-
west, was rife with problems. 64 The National Association of Profes-
sional Base Ball Players ("National Association"), the dominant, but
by no means only, professional league at the time, was besieged
with rumors of gambling and fixed games, causing interest to
wane.6 5 With the game under attack, a group of entrepreneurs saw
the opportunity to highlight their association with the national
game, save it from disgrace and elevate their societal status all in
one fell SWoop. 6 6 In short, they created a new league, the National
League, which promised to rid the professional game of gambling
and other unseemly behavior. 67 Rules were seemingly tightened,
good conduct was supposedly mandated and the national pastime
would once again be in sync with its image. 68 These entrepreneurs
were not shy about trumpeting their civic accomplishments. They
proudly exclaimed that they "rescue [d] the game from its slough of
corruption and disgrace," and protected the "respectable and hon-
orable" game by outlawing such vices as (at least for a time) Sunday
baseball and alcohol in the stands. 69 They, as well as those who
61. See Nathanson, supra note 59, at 73 (noting popular perception that vir-
tues of baseball could be used to instill desirable values in youth).
62. Jeffrey A. Durney, Comment, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major
League Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 583 (1992).
63. Id.
64. See Nathanson, supra note 59, at 71 (blaming baseball's loose organization
as cause of problems).
65. See id. (noting decreasing popularity after allegations of malfeasance be-
came common).
66. See id.
67. See id. (describing attempts by National League to distinguish itself from
professional baseball's recent sordid conduct).
68. See id. (explaining differences in National League hierarchy giving rise to
changes in league culture).
69. Id.
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would follow them in baseball ownership throughout the late nine-
teenth and into the twentieth centuries, promoted themselves as
the gatekeepers of the American way of life, entrusted with the re-
sponsibility of protecting American values and ideals. 70 They were
overwhelmingly successful in spreading their message.
Much of their message was spread via the conduit of the jour-
nalists who covered the teams. 7' Given that many of these journal-
ists were dependant upon the owners for their traveling expenses
and other promotional work thrown their way, they were willing
accomplices. 72 As such, they were eager, through hundreds of arti-
cles written in newspapers and periodicals from coast to coast, to
promote both the game's owners as well as the game itself as essen-
tial tools for teaching the American way of life. By the second dec-
ade of the twentieth century, their message had permeated the
culture. In 1919, philosopher, Morris R. Cohen echoed the prevail-
ing sentiment of the time:
I know full well that baseball is a boy's game, and a profes-
sional sport, and that a properly cultured, serious person
always feels like apologizing for attending a baseball game
instead of a Strauss concert, or a lecture on the customs of
the Fiji Islanders. But I still maintain that, by all the ca-
nons of our modem books on comparative religion, base-
ball is a religion, and the only one that is not sectarian but
national. 73
As the ones entrusted to protect the integrity of this national
religion, the owners of Major League baseball teams were thus ac-
corded a responsibility and therefore an authority higher than that
of mere law. The courts may have kept the masses in line, but MLB
ensured that they remained true Americans.74
Of course, the baseball creed is little more than a cultural fic-
tion in that there has always been a substantial disparity between
the ideology of the game and its realities. The entrepreneurs who
founded the National League did not, after all, prevent gambling,
70. See generally id. (noting National League owners' willingness to self-pro-
mote themselves as saviors of baseball).
71. See id. at 74 (describing journalists' motives for serving as league owners'
mouthpiece).
72. See id. (explaining conflict of interests created by journalists and league
owners).
73. NATHAN, supra note 52, at 15 (quoting Morris R. Cohen, Baseball, THE
DiAL 57, July 26, 1919).
74. See generally, Nathanson, supra note 59 (explaining that owners perceived
"themselves as the gatekeepers of the American way of life").
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game fixing and the other vices that existed beforehand. Regard-
less, the ideology affected the ways in which people behaved and
thought about the game - it was of little matter that the creed was
sheer fantasy. Ultimately, however, the disparities between the
myth and reality were exposed to the extent that the creed wasjeop-
ardized. The revelation of this disparity would test the theory of
baseball as America, and, ironically, result in an even greater ele-
vated status of the game within American society.
B. Scandal and Redemption Through Extra-Legal Means
As stated above, despite MLB owners' protestations to the con-
trary, the national game hardly rid itself of gambling and rumors of
game fixing through the creation of the National League. Regard-
less, the cultural fiction of the baseball creed remained dominant as
these rumors remained just that due to MLB's hesitance to investi-
gate them. And if it was hesitant to confront these rumors directly,
MLB certainly was unwilling to turn to the law to investigate and
potentially punish its players. 75 Consequently, players of "doubtful
loyalty" were tolerated and continued to play Major League ball
from one year to the next out of fear that exposure would damage
the creed irreparably, resulting in a loss of societal status of the
"magnates" who owned the teams and who had appointed them-
selves the gatekeepers of America's national image.
76
Eventually, MLB had no choice but to confront the issue, as
rumors of fixed games grew louder in the early part of the twenti-
eth century. Even before the Black Sox scandal of 1919, rumors
abounded. 77 Shortly before the infamous World Series contest be-
tween the Cincinnati Reds and the Chicago White Sox that season,
reports surfaced that two of the greatest stars of the game - Ty
Cobb and Tris Speaker - conspired to fix a Detroit victory over
Cleveland in an otherwise meaningless game.78 Predictably, MLB
75. See Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Cobb-Speaker Scanda, 13 NINE: A JouRNAL OF
BASEBALL HISTORY & CULTURE 54-55 (2004) (explaining owners' reluctance to rely
on courts to police its players). League owners enjoyed significant negotiating ad-
vantages at the time and were unwilling to submit to the courts for fear of dis-
rupting their cartel-like influence over players. Id.
76. See id. (describing MLB's unwillingness to unsettle public perceptions
about baseball).
77. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 16 (noting rumors of game fixing preceded
Cobb-Speaker controversy).
78. See id. at 16-17 (describing initial inning-by-inning investigation of ques-
tionable plays).
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ignored these reports. 79 When, however, a few weeks later rumors
began spreading that the World Series itself was fixed, tarring the
pinnacle moment of celebration of America's "civil religion," MLB
was, reluctantly, goaded into action.80 Its response would cement
its status as a de facto sovereign entity.
For months, MLB refused to investigate the rumors that Chi-
cago had conspired to throw the Series to Cincinnati.8 ' It is likely
that MLB would have been successful in stonewalling any investiga-
tion of the Series were it not for the tenacity of a sportswriter who
clearly was not beholden to MLB's ownership cabal (at least in this
instance) - Hugh Fullerton.8 2 Fullerton covered the Series and
grew suspicious of what he saw and pressed MLB to take action to
investigate the allegations, but to no avail.83 He tried to publicly
admonish MLB for its inaction through the media but found him-
self stonewalled when Chicago's largest newspaper - the Chicago
Herald and Examiner - refused to run his stories, partly out of con-
cern that challenging baseball's pristine status would hurt newspa-
per sales.8 4 Eventually, he found an outlet for his stories and
turned the heat up on MLB, contending that the image of the
game had been sullied by the rumors and would continue to be
sullied unless the allegations were investigated.8 5 Still, he was ig-
nored. Finally, he pressed the button that brought action, alleging
that it was the status of the owners themselves that was at stake.
Discussing the diminishing stature of the game, Fullerton asserted
that:
[F]ault for this condition lies primarily with the owners.
Their commercialism is directly responsible for the same
spirit among the athletes and their failure to punish even
the appearance of evil has led to the present situation, for
79. See id. at 17 (highlighting baseball establishments non-responsiveness to
allegations of game fixing).
80. See id. at 17-18 (explaining MLB's inaction was broken by harshly critical
newspaper articles).
81. See id. (noting that for months, MLB did nothing to dispel rumors).
82. See id. at 16-18 (cataloging Fullerton's insistent investigation and report-
ing of game fixing allegations).
83. See id. at 17-18 (relating Fullerton's meeting with White Sox owner,
Charles A. Comisky).
84. See id. (explaining newspaper's reluctance was due in part to liability is-
sues and in part to newspaper sales).
85. See id. (reporting that Fullerton's more critical articles were first published
in Joseph Pulitzer's New York Evening World); see also Gene Carney, Uncovering the Fix
of the 1919 World Series: The Role of Hugh Fullerton, 13 NINE: AJOURNAL OF BASEBALL
HISTORY & CULTURE 39, 42-43 (2004) (noting title of Fullerton's critical article, "Is
Big League Baseball Being Run for Gamblers, with Players in the Deal?").
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the entire scandal could have been prevented and the fu-
ture of the game made safe by drastic action .... 86
For a time, MLB still refused to act, rebutting his allegations as
"improbable muckraking. ' 87 Eventually, however, it realized that it
had no choice but to act in order to protect the sanctity of the cul-
tural fiction of the baseball creed.
In a grand gesture, American League president Ban Johnson
publicly proclaimed that he was providing $10,000 in league funds
and hiring two "special prosecutors" to investigate Fullerton's alle-
gations.8 8 These actions were permissible under an Illinois statute
that allowed interested private parties to intervene and assist in the
criminal prosecution of certain cases.8 9 Soon after, the Illinois
State Attorney's Office indicted eight members of the White Sox
and five reputed gamblers for conspiring to fix the 1919 World Se-
ries. 90 With the nexus of baseball and the American legal system
now at hand, MLB recognized the reality that it must take bold and
affirmative action in order to protect its image or risk losing control
of it as it was knocked from its pedestal and treated as any other
nefarious business. The Black Sox scandal was merely the tip of the
iceberg. If even a few of the numerous other rumors of game fixing
were exposed through investigations by state and local prosecutors,
the game's sacred status would be tarnished forever.
Upon Fullerton's urging, MLB dissolved the league's. "National
Commission" - a structurally weak tripartite body that ostensibly
ruled the game - and replaced it with a powerful, autocratic com-
missioner. 91 To fill this position MLB likewise followed Fullerton's
recommendation and hired Kenesaw Mountain Landis, a longtime
friend of MLB who demonstrated his fealty in 1914 when, as a fed-
eral judge, he presided over but refused to rule on the Federal
86. NATHAN, supra note 52, at 18 (quoting KENNETH JENKINS, RE-THINKING HIS-
TORY 5 (Routledge 1991)).
87. Id. at 19 (quoting DAVID Q. VOIGT, AMERICAN BASEBALL: FROM THE COM-
MISSIONERS TO CONTINENTAL ExPANSION 126 (Pennsylvania State University Press
1983)).
88. Michael W. Klein, Rose Is In Red, Black Sox Are Blue: A Comparison of Rose v.
Giamatti and the 1921 Black Sox Trial, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 551, 574
(1991).
89. See id. (explaining cooperation between American League and State of
Illinois in developing prosecution's case).
90. See id. at 573-74 (chronicling indictments on nine counts of conspiring to
defraud individuals and institutions in Illinois); see also NATHAN, supra note 52, at 4.
91. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 4 (discussing Landis's appointment); see also
Carney, supra note 85, at 43 (explaining decision by owners of American League
and National League to establish baseball commissioner).
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League's antitrust suit against the National and American leagues,
choosing instead to wait out the Federal League until it had virtu-
ally exhausted itself out of existence. 92 His public persona fit the
role for which it was designed - protector of the American way of
life - in that he had gained the reputation as a "hanging judge"
who was not intimidated by powerful people or institutions.93 He
famously fined Standard Oil a whopping $29,240,000 for antitrust
violations (which was overturned, as were many of his rulings, on
appeal), 94 challenged the authority of labor leader Big Bill Hay-
wood95 and even tried to exercise jurisdiction over Kaiser Wilhelm I
for Germany's sinking of the Lusitania.96 He looked the part as
well, with his shock of white hair and perpetual sneer he had "the
visage of an Old Testament prophet who ha[d] looked around and
[was] not amused by what he ha[d] seen. '97 And of course there
was the name itself: rock solid, larger than life.98 Not surprisingly,
he was a proponent of the baseball creed, remarking at one point
that "[b]aseball is something more than a game to an American
boy; it is his training for life work. Destroy his faith in its squareness
and honesty and you have destroyed something more; you have
planted suspicion of all things in his heart."99 In Landis, MLB had
92. See Klein, supra note 88, at 558 (describingJudge Landis's ruling resulting
in outcome favorable to MLB). By refusing to rule on the Federal League's case,
Landis forced a settlement between the Federal and Major Leagues which, effec-
tively, dissolved the Federal League. See id. (crediting settlement on Judge Jandis
withholding judgment). One Federal League team, Baltimore, refused to join in
the settlement and pursued its antitrust case against MLB. See id. at 559 (filing suit
against National League, American League and National Commission). Eventually,
the case reached the United States Supreme Court and became the infamous case
in which MLB's antitrust exemption was carved out. See Fed. Baseball Club of Bal-
timore, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922)
(holding that MLB is not subject to federal antitrust laws).
93. See Pachman, supra note 11, at 1415 (noting judge Landis's willingness to
challenge powerful individuals and organizations).
94. See Klein, supra note 88, at 558 (noting damages awarded in United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 155 F. 305, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1907), rev'd, 164 F. 376, 389 (7th Cir.
1908), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 579 (1909)).
95. See Pachman, supra note 93, at 1415 (explaining perception that Judge
Landis's personality and reputation made him well-suited to reform baseball's du-
bious recent history).
96. WILLIAM MARSHALL, BASEBALL'S PIVOTAL ERA: 1945-1951 4 (The University
Press of Kentucky 1999) (explainingJudgeJandis's willingness to challenge power-
ful people and his attempt to extradite Kaiser Wilhem).
97. See Durney, supra note 62, at 585 (quoting George F. Will, A One-Man Error
Machine, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1990, at 57).
98. Rader, supra note 55, at 120.
99. NATHAN, supra note 52, at 49 (quoting LEE LOWENFISH & TONY LUPIEN,
THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: THE STORY OF BASEBALL'S RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE MEN
WHO FOUGHT TO CHANGE IT 104 (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1980)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
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found the image necessary to elevate the game above the mundane
once more.
Landis was not so easily convinced to accept the position, how-
ever. Perhaps taking into account the numerous times he had been
reversed upon appeal, he was unwilling to accept such humiliations
anymore, stating that he would only take on the role if he were
granted absolute power, answerable to no one either within or
outside of Major League Baseball. 10 0 Despite MLB's assurances that
he would have this power, he refused to accept the job until a new
Major League Agreement was drafted, one that cemented his au-
thority and insulated him from the vagaries of the appellate pro-
cess. 10 1 Left with no choice, MLB eventually relented and ceded
the authority to him that he demanded. 10 2 With that, Landis
stepped into his new role and proceeded to remove the stain upon
the national pastime's image.
Although acting in his official capacity as the game's protector,
Landis's investigation into gambling and game fixing within MLB
was exceedingly limited in scope. Rather than tackling the numer-
ous rumors that swirled around the game, Landis chose to investi-
gate the alleged World Series fix only, proceeding on the "single sin
myth" that the 1919 fix was the only instance of foul play within
MLB. 10 3 In this way, he could rather easily restore the game's im-
age: simply punish the lone transgressors and return the game to its
lofty perch. 10 4 The potential morass involved in investigating the
culture of corruption that led the 1919 fix would be avoided due to
its unwieldy nature. Very quickly, it became clear that Landis was
out to "solve" the Black Sox scandal, rather than address the under-
lying problems that led to it, and to return MLB to its elevated sta-
tus as quickly as possible. In this way, he would reassert the cultural
fiction of the baseball creed, evidence to the contrary be damned,
100. See Jonathan M. Reinsdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in Baseball, 7
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 211, 220-21, 246-47 (1996) (discussing appointment of Landis as
commissioner but only upon condition of grant of "absolute power when making
decisions" to him and removal of power limiting clause from Major League
Agreement).
101. See id. at 220-21 ("Landis would not accept the position until a new Na-
tional Agreement was drafted.").
102. See id. (noting owners' relinquishment of power and approval by owners
and Landis of new Major League Agreement).
103. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 7 (citing David Q. Voigt, The Chicago Black
Sox and the Myth of Baseball's Single Sin," in AMERICA THROUGH BASEBALL 65, 73 (Chi-
cago: Nelson-Hall 1976)) (explaining why Black Sox scandal has endured all these
years).
104. See id. (noting that Landis would tag this scandal for punishment only to
maintain feeling that this was sole transgression).
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that nevertheless was prevalent before Hugh Fullerton intervened
and exposed it as myth. He would be aided in this regard by the
new Major League Agreement he had insisted upon as conditional
to taking the position. Soon, through his handling of the Black Sox
scandal as well as his indifference to other, similar allegations, Lan-
dis would accomplish what MLB had set out to do when it hired
him - return baseball to its elevated plane, immune from the reach
of federal law.
C. The 1921 Major League Agreement, the Black Sox, and
Their Immediate Aftermath
As stated above, Landis was adamant that he would not accept
the position of commissioner without the grant of absolute, unques-
tioned authority. Accordingly, when, during the final drafting ses-
sion of the 1921 Major League Agreement the owners added a
clause that would make the commissioner's power to suspend or
expel club or league officials or employees advisory rather than fi-
nal, Landis threatened to walk away from the job. 10 5 With the im-
age of America's game hanging in the balance, the owners were left
with no choice but to accede to Landis's demand: the offending
provision was struck and Landis was granted absolute power. 10 6
The finalized Major League Agreement bestowed unparalleled
power in the hands of one man: Landis was to be the final arbiter of
disputes between leagues, clubs and players, the determinant of
punishment for any conduct he deemed to be contrary to the best
interests of the game, and the arbiter of disagreements over pro-
posed amendments to league rules.10 7 In a catch-all provision that
he would invoke numerous times throughout his tenure, and which
would provide authority for virtually any action he wished to take,
the Agreement permitted him "to take other steps as he might
deem necessary and proper in the interest and morale of the play-
ers and the honor of the game."'01 8 And perhaps most importantly,
(and most indicative of the owners' desperation for the moral salva-
tion of their game), the owners expressly waived any rights to chal-
105. See Reinsdorf, supra note 100, at 246-47 ("Landis response made it clear,
however, that he would not accept the position if the clause was not removed from
the contract .... ").
106. See id. at 247 ("Needless to say, the clause was withdrawn and the owners
believed they were giving Landis the powers he requested.").
107. See id. at 221-22 (delineating authority granted to Landis as commis-
sioner via new Major League Agreement); see also Pachman, supra note 11, at 1415
(listing numerous powers granted to Landis in his position as commissioner).
108. Major League Agreement art. I, § 4 (1921); see also id. § 2 (enumerating
other powers of commissioner).
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lenge Landis's rulings in court, "no matter what would be the
severity of the new Commissioner's discipline."'10 9 Taken together,
the Agreement anointed Landis with "autocratic power over every-
one in baseball, from the humblest bat boy to a major league presi-
dent."110 Through the 1921 Major League Agreement, Landis
would be able to rule from a perch high above the judicial branch,
allowing him to restore public confidence in the game and to di-
minish the role of the legal system in baseball's affairs all at once, a
point he was not shy about making. 'Just keep in mind," he once
said, "that regardless of the verdict of juries, baseball is entirely
competent to protect itself against the crooks both inside and
outside the game.""'
Landis wielded his power from the moment he assumed his
new role. On August 2, 1921, the eight indicted players and five
indicted gamblers were acquitted by a jury of all charges. 112 Landis
was unmoved despite thejubilated courtroom and relieved baseball
fans across the nation. The next day he asserted MLB's superior
moral authority by banishing all eight players from the game any-
way.' 1 3 He stated:
Regardless of the verdict ofjuries, no player who throws a
ball game, no player that sits in conference with a bunch
of crooked players and gamblers where the ways and
means of throwing a game are discussed, and does not
promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional
baseball. 114
In his newly-appointed role as the moral conscience of the na-
tional pastime, Landis did not need to investigate the allegations on
his own, nor preside over a hearing in order to reach his verdict.
Rather, his job was to administer a "character bath" to the game,
regardless of the vagaries of the legal system." 5 For this he was
widely hailed. By banishing the Black Sox, he effectively, in the
109. Pachman, supra note 11, at 1415; see also Major League Agreement art.
VII, § 2 (1921) (stating that all parties to contracts in baseball shall "submit them-
selves to the discipline of the commissioner.").
110. J. Spink, JUDGE LANDIS AND TwEN-rFrvE YEARS OF BASEBALL 76 (1947).
111. Id. at 84.
112. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 5 (explaining trial of Black Sox scandal
participants).
113. See id. at 31 (stating that Landis "gave the incident closure" by throwing
out players).
114. Id.
115. See id. (noting that "[t]hrough his action the verdict became an acquittal
only in a technical sense.").
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words of one baseball historian, "reaffirmed professional baseball's
position as a respectable social institution whose ethical standards
were demonstrably superior to those of the law."116 He stayed true
to his reputation as a jurist who administered "tough justice," and
his decision signaled the return of integrity to America's game.
1 17
He took the law into his own hands and administered what many
believed to be justice, irrespective of the jury's verdict. In the end,
to many Americans, truth had prevailed even though the law did
not. The Black Sox may have been found innocent within the
world of law but Landis insisted that they face judgment in a higher
court - his.118 In the process, the extra-legal and sovereign author-
ity of Major League Baseball was firmly established. Landis's pun-
ishment of the Black Sox set the precedent for his tenure as
Commissioner, where he ruled not with a sword of justice but with
an "extra-legal scythe" to be used at his pleasure and whim. 119 This
was particularly true given that, regardless of his ministrations,
there was nothing that anyone within MLB could do to check him -
the owners had forfeited their right to access to the courts in the
1921 Agreement.
Shortly after the Black Sox scandal, Landis once again wielded
his scythe in an effort to protect MLB's position as an institution
with its own system of justice, separate and apart from that of fed-
eral law. In 1926, two members of the banned Black Sox an-
nounced that a series of games between the White Sox and the
Detroit Tigers in 1917 had been similarly fixed. 120 In fact, Landis
had been made aware of this accusation four years earlier, in 1922,
but chose to ignore it in order to protect the integrity of the "single
sin myth" surrounding the 1919 World Series. 121 Now, however,
with the accusation aired in public, Landis was forced into action.
He held a series of "hearings" over the course of several days, where
he served not only asjudge, but as prosecutor, defense attorney and
116. Id. at 50.
117. See id. at 62 (describing Landis as "baseball's czar").
118. See Anderson, supra note 1 (comparing Bonds indictment with Black Sox
scandal, praising Landis in ignoring judicial acquittal of Black Sox, and stating,
"[t]ruth had prevailed, as it usually does.").
119. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLYYEARs 338 (Oxford University
Press 1989).
120. See Lowell Blaisdell, Judge Landis Takes a Different Approach, 15 NINE: A
JOURNAL OF BASEBALL HisToRy AND CULTURE 32, 32-33 (2007) (explaining players'
game fixing revelation to public).
121. See id. at 41 (describing circumstances of earlier revelation to Landis); see
also Voigt, supra note 103, at 73.
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jury as well.' 22 He permitted oral testimony only, refused to call
independent witnesses or to release the box scores of the games -
which would have revealed a curious pattern of play - to the pub-
lic. 123 He also treated the witnesses for the prosecution and de-
fense differently: he required the testimony of the accusers to take
place in the presence of the defense witnesses who could then mold
their subsequent testimony to rebut that of what they had just
heard; the accusers, however, were permitted only sporadic oppor-
tunities to respond to contrary testimony. 124 In addition, although
Landis encouraged the exposure of inconsistencies in the accusers'
testimony through this procedure, he failed to follow up on likely
misleading or inconsistent testimony presented by the defense wit-
nesses. 125 In the end, there was only one verdict that was possible -
the verdict that Landis had orchestrated through his actions in or-
ganizing and presiding over the hearing. 126 The players were exon-
erated and the single sin myth remained intact. Most importantly,
the accusation was "resolved" by MLB itself, quickly and emphati-
cally, before the legal system had time to intervene. In his handling
of this affair, Landis made sure that he would provide closure to the
episode. There would be no replay of the Black Sox trial in open
court, subject once again to the whim of juries and the require-
ments of due process.
Around the same time, Landis was confronted with yet another
scandal, this one involving two of the greatest stars of the game.
Once again, he administered "baseball justice" in an effort to main-
tain jurisdiction for misdeeds within the game in-house rather than
in the legal system. In 1926, the rumors of game fixing by Ty Cobb
and Tris Speaker, which had briefly surfaced in 1919 shortly after
the games in question were played, reemerged.' 27 Coming on the
heels of the Detroit-Chicago "hearings," Landis had no choice but
to take action. And once again he did so both swiftly and with final-
ity. Two weeks after exonerating the Tigers and the White Sox, he
122. See Blaisdell, supra note 120, at 32-33 (explaining Landis's hearings in
1927 responding to Chicago game fixing allegations).
123. See id. at 36 (criticizing the limited procedural safeguards imposed dur-
ing hearings).
124. See id. (noting methodological disadvantages leveraged against those al-
leging game fixing).
125. See id. (highlighting uneven treatment of accusers and defendants).
126. See id. at 41-42 (identifying Landis's behavior in shaping outcome of
hearings).
127. See id. at 61 (noting resentful feelings existing between Cobb and his
accuser).
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did the same to both Cobb and Speaker. 128 This time, however, he
convened no hearings, heard no testimony, considered no evi-
dence. 12 9 He refused to release the box scores and game descrip-
tions to the public, some of which hinted at the possibility that the
game in question proceeded in a curious fashion. 30 Interestingly,
however, and in tacit recognition that there was more to the matter
than he was otherwise letting on, Landis proclaimed that, although
Cobb and Speaker were cleared of any wrongdoing, they would
need to play for different teams in the upcoming season if they
wished to continue to play Major League baseball.'13
The lack of consistency in Landis's rulings, as exposed through
his handling of the three scandals noted above, indicate his desire
to mold his verdicts to whatever he predetermined would best pro-
tect the image of America's game. For instance, Landis expelled
Buck Weaver of the Black Sox for merely having knowledge of the
fix (there was no evidence that he took money or participated in it)
in his effort to "cleanse" the game. On the other hand, he exoner-
ated both Cobb and Speaker who, even if they did not participate in
a fix of the game in question, at a minimum had knowledge of an
attempt to do so. He did this to protect the image of a game that
had presumptively already been cleansed.'3 2 Landis massaged in-
vestigations, or refused to even conduct them, such that they would
uniformly result in verdicts that exalted baseball and not in ones
that damaged its reputation. In his twenty-four years in office, Lan-
dis banned thirteen men for various crimes committed against base-
ball.13 3  He likewise fined numerous others for sins such as
offensive language, barnstorming in the off-season and other simi-
lar offenses. 134 All of this was done with a singular goal: to present
a facade of a pristine, all-American game thatjibed with the cultural
fiction of the baseball creed. In so doing, and in reassuring the
public that "a firm patriarchal hand of justice ruled over the na-
128. See id. at 65 (explaining Landis's verdict and conditions thereto).
129. See id. (questioning Landis's decision to eschew a formal investigation).
130. See id. at 61-62 (noting common suspicions arising from failure to release
box scores).
131. See id. at 65 (characterizing this requirement as trivial).
132. See id. at 66 (positing how Landis's judicial experience may have influ-
enced his approach to allegations and investigations).
133. See Pachman, supra note 11, at 1415-16 (noting that crimes ranged "from
gambling to the suggestion by a pitcher that he would leave his club so that it
would not win the pennant.").
134. See id. (highlighting Landis's power and willingness to punish offenders
including, notably, club president and Babe Ruth).
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tion's pastime," its societal role as an elevated, sovereign institution
remained firmly intact.
135
IV. JUDICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE EXTRA-LEGAL AUTHORITY
OF MLB
A. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
The legal system historically has been all too eager to play into
this fiction, deferring to MLB and its "law of baseball" whenever
possible, and allowing it to manage its own affairs without fear of
judicial or Congressional oversight. This was first officially recog-
nized in the Supreme Court's 1922 ruling in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,13 6
where it upheld the D.C. Circuit's ruling that MLB was exempt
from federal antitrust laws. 137 In so doing, the Supreme Court
skirted around the obvious - that MLB was a business not unlike
any other, engaging in interstate commerce - and held that it was
somehow different, transcendent, above such mundane acts of leg-
islation as the Sherman Act. 138 To hold otherwise, would be to
hold that America's game was no different than a shirt factory, and
this simply would not do. 139 The cultural fiction of the baseball
creed would not permit it. Thirty-one years later, when presented
with the opportunity to reverse itself in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 140 the Court refused to do so, holding instead that it was up
to Congress to demystify the national pastime if it so chose.
141 It
would not be the body that would smash the myth. Finally, in 1972,
in Flood v. Kuhn,"4 2 the Court admitted that it had erred in Federal
Baseball when it held that MLB was not engaged in interstate com-
135. Norman L. Rosenberg, Here Comes the Judge!: The Origins of Baseball's Com-
missioner System and American Legal Culture, 20 JOURNAL OF POPULAR CULTURE 140
(Spring 1987).
136. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
137. See id. at 208-09 (holding that because interstate transport of players is
incidental, not essential to baseball, baseball may be characterized as non-
commerce).
138. See Nathanson, supra note 59, at 77-79 (noting three important twentieth
century Supreme Court rulings on business nature of baseball).
139. See id. (noting Supreme Court's treatment of baseball as occupying
unique niche in American heritage).
140. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
141. See id. at 357 (declining to subject baseball to antitrust regulation in ac-
cordance with Congressional intent to maintain such exemption for baseball); see
also Nathanson, supra note 59, at 78-79 (highlighting Supreme Court's refusal to
demystify baseball).
142. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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merce. 143 But, nevertheless, the Court refused to overturn the deci-
sion or to render the Sherman Act applicable to MLB. 144 Instead,
in a telling passage, the Court held that the Federal Base Ball and
Toolson decisions were "aberration[s] confined to baseball."145 Fur-
ther, in justifying the perpetuation of these aberrations, Justice
Blackmun, after engaging in a long, syrupy, retelling of the mythi-
cal history of America's game, announced in plain terms that base-
ball was indeed something different than anything else:
Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive that
it would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judi-
cial notice that baseball is everybody's business. To put it
mildly and with restraint, it would be unfortunate indeed
if a fine sport and profession, which brings surcease from
daily travail and an escape from the ordinary to most in-
habitants of this land, were to suffer in the least because of
undue concentration by any one or any group on com-
mercial and profit considerations. The game is on higher
ground; it behooves every one to keep it there. 146
No other industry, not even another professional sports league,
was to be granted such deference by the highest court in the land.
Baseball was special. The antitrust exemption was merely one way
of acknowledging this reality. If there was ever any doubt that base-
ball was not subject to the ordinary rules governing the rest of soci-
ety, Blackmun's opinion in Flood removed any trace of it.
B. Judicial Deference to the Powers of MLB's Commissioner
The antitrust exemption is not the only area in which courts
have deferred to baseball law. The U.S. legal system has likewise
been very willing to defer to MLB in other areas as well, treating it
once again unlike other businesses and even unlike other profes-
sional sports leagues. This first became apparent in 1931, in Mil-
waukee American Association v. Landis,147 when the Northern District
of Illinois recognized the unique and powerful authority inherent
143. See id. at 282 (referring to exemption from antitrust laws as
"aberration").
144. See id. (noting that Federal Baseball had been established fifty years prior).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
147. 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
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in Judge Landis's Commissioner's office. 148 As stated above, upon
accepting the position in 1921, Landis sought complete, autocratic,
unchallenged control over MLB and the Major League Agreement
was drafted in order to provide him with it. From the moment it
was first tested in federal court ten years later, it was clear that Lan-
dis's goal had been realized.
The facts of Milwaukee American Association were somewhat con-
voluted and labyrinthine. The case involved the repeated reassign-
ment and optioning of a player who at one point had been under
contract to the St. Louis Cardinals but whose contractual status had
become questionable given that each team he was assigned to was
either owned or controlled by the Cardinals. 14 9 Before the case,
Commissioner Landis had ruled that St. Louis's option of the
player to Milwaukee of the minor league American Association was
void and that the player must either be returned to St. Louis, be
transferred to a club not controlled or owned by St. Louis (unlike
Milwaukee) or be released unconditionally. Landis was no fan of
St. Louis' pioneered "farm system" in which one main club owned
or controlled several minor league clubs and shuffled the players
from club to club. Pursuant to the power granted to him under the
1921 Major League Agreement, he took a strong stand against such
joint ownership in ruling that such shuffling was contrary to the
"best interests" of the game. At issue before the court was whether
Landis's "best interests" power held any legal weight when chal-
lenged in a court of law.
At the outset of the opinion, the court made clear that in fact it
did. The court took notice of the broad swath of power granted to
the Commissioner by MLB in an effort to "preserve discipline and a
high standard of morale," concluding that this "disclose [s] a clear
intent upon the part of the parties to endow the commissioner with
all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot and all the
disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater familias."'150 With the
Black Sox scandal less than a decade in the past, the court was quite
willing to defer to MLB in its efforts to preserve a code of conduct
above and beyond that required by the legal system. As such, al-
though it recognized the reality of Landis as an "absolute despot," it
was not uncomfortable with this designation.
148. See id. at 299 (describing Commissioner as being endowed with "all the
attributes of a benevolent but absolute despot[ic]" power).
149. See id. at 299-300 (describing factual background of player's trade
history).
150. Id. at 299.
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Further, the court held that the "best interests" provisions of
the Major League Agreement that granted the Commissioner not
only the power to resolve disputes brought to him, but also the
power to initiate investigations on his own volition and to decide on
whatever remedial action he deemed appropriate were not limited
in any fashion:
[T] he provisions are so unlimited in character that we can
conclude only that the parties did not intend so to limit
the meaning of conduct detrimental to baseball, but in-
tended to vest in the commissioner jurisdiction to prevent
any conduct destructive of the aims of the code. ... So
great was the parties' confidence in the man selected for
the position and so great the trust placed in him that cer-
tain of the agreements were to continue only so long as he
should remain commissioner. 151
Given the deference to baseball law, the court was not uncom-
fortable ceding authority to a system that embraced the rule of man
over the rule of law - the polar opposite of the most basic tenet of
the American legal system. This deference would prove trouble-
some over a half century later when Pete Rose would find himself
deprived of a property right as a result of this inverted system of
justice.
A further indication of the extent to which the court was will-
ing to defer to the authority of Commissioner Landis was its re-
sponse to the argument that the provision of the Major League
Agreement wherein the club owners expressly waived their right of
access to the courts was in violation of public policy in that it de-
prived the court of its jurisdiction. Once again, the court appeared
to be untroubled by this unfettered, unchecked grant of absolute
power to one man. While acknowledging that most such provisions
are "commonly held void," here, the court held that submission of a
dispute to Commissioner Landis as arbiter was not, provided that
his decision was not unsupported by the evidence or "unless the
decision is upon some basis without legal foundation or beyond le-
gal recognition."'152 What was left unsaid was how these determina-
tions were to be made if all access to the courts was barred. In a
roundabout fashion, the court soothed itself by concluding that the
baseball commissioner's rulings could never be considered arbi-
trary or improper because they were necessarily made in further-
151. Id. at 302.
152. See id. at 303 (acknowledging the broad grant of arbitration powers).
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ance of his pursuit "to keep the game of baseball clean. ' 153 When
and if this pursuit tramples the rights of others who may get in his
way was not a question the court appeared willing to answer. In a
case that, on its face, would seem to raise red flags, and one in
which the court recognized the presence of absolute, unchecked,
despotic power, the court curiously identified these qualities as jus-
tification for deferring to a private body rather than stepping in
and acting as a judicial check. Legal instinct and common sense
would seem to dictate a contrary result. But such senses are of little
use when the legal system is confronted with America's game.
After Landis's death in 1944, MLB revised the Major League
Agreement, removing the prohibition of access to judicial review
and reigning in future commissioners' power by requiring that only
conduct that violated a specific league rule could violate the "best
interests" clause.1 54 These limitations, however, lasted only twenty
years. In 1964, outgoing commissioner Ford Frick convinced club
owners to strike these changes and return to the office of the com-
missioner the broad array of unchecked powers enjoyed by Judge
Landis. 15 5 And once again, the federal judiciary confirmed both
that these powers had been restored in full and that it would defer
to MLB just as it had under Commissioner Landis.
In June of 1976, Oakland A's owner Charles 0. Finley sold
some of his star players to the Boston Red Sox and New York
Yankees rather than risk losing them to free agency at the end of
the season. 156 Commissioner Bowie Kuhn nullified the sales, assert-
ing that they would debilitate the A's, upset the competitive balance
of the American League and violate the "best interests" clause.
1 57
Finley challenged Kuhn's ruling in federal court and the case even-
tually reached the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1978. In
upholding Kuhn's actions, the court reiterated Justice Blackmun's
refrain in Flood that "baseball cannot be analogized to any other
business or even to any other sport or entertainment."1 58 Likewise,
the court noted that baseball's Commissioner was similarly unique
in that no other sport or business had a comparable position; one
153. See Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 303 (N.D. Il. 1931)
(finding that Landis's decisions were made with proper motives).
154. See Pachman, supra note 11, at 1416-17 (noting significant changes to
Major League Charter).
155. See id. at 1417 (highlighting restoration of Landis-era powers).
156. See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530-32 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining
player trades giving rise to dispute).
157. See id. at 531 (noting Commissioner Kuhn's concerns).
158. Id. at 537.
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designed to protect and promote the "morale of the players and the
honor of the game." 159 "While it is true," the court announced,
"that professional baseball selected as its first Commissioner a fed-
eral judge, it intended only him and not the judiciary as a whole to
be its umpire and governor." 1 60 Moreover, the court tacitly recog-
nized the cultural fiction of the baseball creed and the unique role
of baseball in American society when it noted that in 1957, the Su-
preme Court held that, unlike baseball, the antitrust laws do in fact
apply to professional football. This, the court reasoned, was a "sub-
stantive pronouncement" with regard to the nexus between base-
ball and the legal system in that it indicated that baseball was
something special and, as such, should be treated differently by the
legal system than other professional sports. 161
The court then expanded upon the holding in Landis by ruling
that the actions of the Commissioner can even be arbitrary and in
direct contradiction of previous rulings without running afoul of
either the Major League Agreement or the law. 162 Finley contended
that, at a minimum, the Commissioner's actions must be consistent
with "prior baseball tradition" and that his power was limited to rul-
ing only on those violations that were either immoral or unethical
or which were in contradiction to posted league rules. 63 The court
rejected these claims and thereby rejected any limitations placed
upon the power of the Commissioner to act, unchecked, pursuant
to the "best interests" clause. 164 It does not appear from the lan-
guage of the Landis opinion that the court was ever willing to go
that far, citing as it did the requirement that the Commissioner's
actions be consistent with "legal foundation."'165 The Finley court's
recognition of the power of the Commissioner to act in an arbitrary
fashion appears to reject this most basic limitation.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 541 (noting common law precedent for unique legal treatment
of baseball).
162. See id. at 536-37.
163. See id. (outlining Finley's complaints over Kuhn's decision).
164. See id. at 539.
We conclude that the evidence fully supports, and we agree with, the dis-
trict court's finding and conclusion that the Commissioner "acted in
good faith, after investigation, consultation and deliberation, in a manner
which he determined to be in the best interests of baseball" and that
"[w]hether he was right or wrong is beyond the competence and the ju-
risdiction of this court to decide."
Id.
165. See SPINK, supra note 110, at 303.
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The Finley court did, however, establish a two-pronged test to
determine when the judiciary would be justified in interceding in
baseball's affairs. The test, however, was couched in an excess of
language deferential to the autonomy of MLB such that it was un-
clear precisely when a court could intervene pursuant to this test.
Specifically, the court held that MLB must "follow the basic rudi-
ments of due process of law.' 66 In addition, MLB had to follow its
own rules and regulations. a67 Failure to adhere to either of these
parameters would constitute exceptions to the nonreviewability
clause. 168 Absent these facts, the courts were content to steer clear
of the legal business of baseball. "Any other conclusion would in-
volve the courts in not only interpreting often complex rules of
baseball to determine if they were violated but also, as noted in the
Landis case, the 'intent of the (baseball) code,' an even more com-
plicated and subjective task. 1 69 Of course, courts have been more
than willing to intercede into the affairs of other organizations with
similarly confusing, Byzantine codes of conduct. But those other
organizations are not Major League Baseball.
On the heels of Finley came Atlanta National League Baseball Club
v. Kuhn.170 In this case, the Northern District of Georgia was
presented with a squabble between Commissioner Kuhn and At-
lanta Braves owner Ted Turner that emanated from boasts made by
Turner at an October 1976 cocktail party. At the party, Turner told
San Francisco Giants owner Bob Lurie that he was willing to spend
whatever it took to lure free agent Gary Matthews (who had just
completed his option year with the Giants and who was soon to be a
free agent) from the Giants to his Braves. The Braves had previ-
ously been fined for tampering with Matthews a month earlier and,
as an additional punishment, Kuhn denied the Braves their selec-
tion in the first round of the January 1977 amateur draft. Lurie
filed a complaint with Kuhn and Kuhn held that Turner's com-
ments were in violation of the "best interests" clause on several
grounds. As a result, although Kuhn did not disapprove the Braves'
signing of Matthews (which occurred between the date of Turner's
boast and the date of Kuhn's hearing on the matter), he did sus-
166. See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (limiting MLB's
autonomy).
167. See id. (explaining that nonreviewability of private actions is contingent
on adherence to organization's rules and regulations).
168. See id. (noting that adherence to organization's rules and adherence to
basic due process are required).
169. Id. at 539.
170. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977) [hereinafter Atlanta].
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pend Turner for one year and reaffirmed the stripping of the
Braves' first round draft choice in the 1977 amateur draft. Turner
filed a complaint in federal court and, once again, the extent of the
Commissioner's "best interests" powers were examined by the judi-
ciary. Once again, the judiciary read them to be remarkably broad.
Initially, the court rejected Kuhn's assertion that Finley held
that the nonreviewabilty clause deprived the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Instead, and seemingly in conflict with Finley the court
held that the actions of the commissioner cannot be arbitrary and
that the arbitrary nature of a Commissioner's decision is one for the
courts to decide. 171 What it gave with one hand, however, it took
with the other as, in exercising this judicial oversight function, the
court demonstrated just how far it was willing to go in order to de-
fer to MLB and how differently it was willing to treat MLB from any
other professional sports league. This becomes clear when Atlanta
is contrasted with a case that was factually similar in many respects
other than the most important one: namely, that it did not involve
MLB.
Three years prior to Atlanta, the Western District of Texas
heard Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, Ltd.172
a case that involved the powers of the Commissioner of the Ameri-
can Basketball Association ("ABA"), which, at the time, was a strug-
gling rival of the established National Basketball Association
("NBA") .173 In that case, the plaintiffs, the San Antonio Spurs, pur-
chased a player, George Gervin, from the Virginia Squires, for
$225,000. Upon his review of the proposed purchase, the ABA's
Commissioner vetoed the sale, citing his authority under the ABA's
by-laws that permitted him to settle any and all disputes in which
either a player or coach is a party. 174 Similar to the Major League
Agreement, the ABA's by-laws stated that "[the Commissioners] de-
cision[s] in such matters shall be final."'1 75 The Spurs challenged
171. See id. at 1218 (finding that extent of Commissioner Kuhn's power is
properly within court's jurisdiction).
172. 373 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex. 1974) [hereinafter Pro Sports Ltd.].
173. See id. at 953 (limiting commissioner's power to assign player's contract).
174. See id. at 948-49 (explaining that the Commissioner exercised his arbitra-
tion authority).
175. Id. at 949 (quoting ABA by-laws). The relevant portion of the ABA's by-
laws (Art. IV, § 5) stated:
The Commissioner shall hear and finally decide any dispute to which a
player or a coach is a party. In all matters pertaining to the eligibility of
players and all disputes arising between clubs relative to title to players'
contracts, the Commissioner shall make such investigation, and call such
witnesses and demand such papers as he deems necessary, and his deci-
sion in such matters shall be final.
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the Commissioner's authority to intervene in the sale and the court
agreed that the Commissioner had acted improperly. The court
held that, although the Commissioner did have the power to act as
an arbiter to settle disputes, he did not have such power when it was
the Commissioner himself who created the dispute. 176 Here, as the
court noted, both teams agreed upon the terms of the deal. Only
the Commissioner objected to the arrangement. As such, the court
held that "[w] hile the by-laws clearly contemplate arbitration by the
Commissioner of disputes between clubs when he is acting impar-
tially, it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to believe that the
club members ever intended to authorize him to settle disputes
which he himself had instigated .... -1177 Although the league's by-
laws further empowered the Commissioner to "cancel or terminate
any contracts... for violation of the provisions of the Certificate of
Incorporation and By-Laws or for any action detrimental to the wel-
fare of the League or professional basketball," the court held that
this "best interests" clause would not save him in this case, given
that the Commissioner's actions were taken without the required
notice and hearing. 178 The court held:
IT] he principles of fundamental fairness, as well as the by-
laws themselves, contemplate a meaningful "notice and
hearing" in actions taken under these sections, and since
proceedings of this nature could have the effect of depriv-
ing a party of some property right, these terms should be
construed to require at least the minimum essentials of
"due process."1 79
In sum, "[t] he simple truth is that the member clubs have not given
the Commissioner the power and authority he claims."18 0
The Atlanta court acknowledged the holding in Pro Sports Ltd.
but concluded that it was ultimately inapplicable to the issues
Id.
176. See id. at 950 (stating holding).
177. Id.
178. See Prof 1 Sports, Ltd. v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, Ltd., 373 F. Supp.
946, 951 (W.D. Tex. 1974). The court stated:
No notice of any hearing to be held at a specified time and place was
given either orally or in writing; there is no indication that the Commis-
sioner apprised the plaintiff of the nature of the charges; and he certainly
did not apprise plaintiff of the basis for his authority to act. There could
have been no "meaningful" hearing, for the parties had no opportunity
to present witnesses, documents or other relevant information ....
Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 952.
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before it. In dismissing Braves' owner Ted Turner's argument that
both Pro Sports Ltd. and Atlanta involved disputes generated by the
Commissioner himself, the court held that here, Commissioner
Kuhn was not acting pursuant to his power as an arbiter (which
presumably would be improper in this instance according to Pro
Sports Ltd.) but rather, pursuant to his "best interests" power which
authorized him to investigate any act, either upon complaint or
upon his own initiative, alleged or suspected to be in violation of
the "best interests" of the game, and to determine the appropriate
punishment, if any. 181 The court, however, ignored the remainder
of Pro Sports Ltd., which contemplated the "best interests" clause of
the ABA's by-laws and held that any actions taken pursuant to this
clause with the potential to affect a property right must be accom-
panied by "at least the minimum essentials of due process." Unlike
the Pro Sports Ltd. court, the Atlanta court did not investigate
whether the Major League Agreement included any form of notice
or hearing provisions in conjunction with the Commissioner's "best
interests" power, and if so, whether they were adhered to in this
case at all, let alone, in a "meaningful" way. Even the Finley court
made passing mention of how "the basic rudiments of due process
of law" must be followed;18 2 however, when put to the test, the At-
lanta court was not prepared to hold MLB to this requirement.
The dichotomy between Pro Sports Ltd. and the MLB cases evi-
dences the differences in treatment by the federal judiciary of
members of professional sports leagues in general and those within
MLB. Non-MLB members are afforded at least some level of judi-
cially protected due process - perhaps not Constitutional due pro-
cess, but some level of fundamental fairness. On the other hand,
MLB members do not seem to enjoy the same privilege. This be-
comes particularly acute when it is the rights and interests of ath-
letes that are involved. Taken together, the Landis, Finley and
Atlanta cases appear to stand for the proposition that MLB can
waive the rudimentary due process rights of its players via the Major
League Agreement, of which the Players Association is not a signa-
tory, regardless of any potential property interests that may be at
181. See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (discussing article 1, section 2 of Major League Agreement which
gives Commissioner authority to determine when punitive action is appropriate).
182. See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that Major
League Agreement's waiver of recourse clause is generally valid, except (1) when
rules, regulations or judgments of association are in contravention to laws of the
land or in disregard of charter or bylaws of association or (2) when association has
failed to follow basic rudiments of due process of law).
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issue. This was evidenced in the Black Sox case in 1922 and would
become clear once more in 1989 when Pet Rose would face a simi-
lar banishment from MLB. As shown by the court's holding in Pro
Sports Ltd., the ABA, or any other professional sport, would most
likely face stern judicial resistance if it attempted to similarly punish
a player after the cursory hearings held first by Commissioner Lan-
dis and later by Bart Giamatti.
Some commentators have suggested that the sheer simplicity
of the Major League Agreement causes federal courts to avoid the
intricacies of Major League Baseball's internal affairs. 183 In the
NFL charter, the powers of the Commissioner are spelled out in
stunning breadth and depth, with the range of acceptable punish-
ments explicitly detailed. 184 In the NBA, the "standard player con-
tract" specifies that players may be suspended only for activities
related to gambling; all other "detrimental" activities may be re-
dressed by way of fine only.1 85 Because the Major League Agree-
ment contains none of the specificity or limiting provisions as those
contained within the relevant NFL and NBA documents, some have
concluded that courts defer to this seemingly broad, unlimited
grant of power to MLB's Commissioner. 18 6 This argument, how-
ever, appears to cut against the case for judicial deference in that
this broad grant of unlimited power would necessarily fail the "fun-
damental fairness" tests of both Pro Sports Ltd. and Finley due to
vagueness. Without clearly demarcated procedures designed to en-
183. See Pachman, supra note 11, at 1417-19 (explaining how detailed and
strict provisions of NFL and NBA are more easily strictly regulated by American
courts, because of their specificity and clarity; conversely, short and vague provi-
sions of MLB are more nebulous and are assumed to be governed by MLB and
thus, are avoided by outside courts).
184. See id.
Not every sports league has a charter a simple as the baseball charter. In
football, for example, article VIII of the constitution and bylaws of the
National Football League (NFL) describes powers of the commissioner in
a very detailed manner. The NFL charter specifically states the punish-
ments its commissioner may impose. If none of those punishments ade-
quately address the certain case, the NFL commissioner, in what is a
significant departure from the approach in baseball, must seek the ap-
proval of an executive committee to deviate from the punishments al-
lowed by the charter.
Id.
185. See id. ("An exception is found in the National Basketball Association
(NBA) standard player contract. The provisions of that document indicate that
NBA players acknowledge the commissioner's right to suspend them for activities
related to gambling, but that other 'detrimental' activities are restricted to punish-
ment by fine.").
186. See id. (making argument through contrasting MLB to other sports
associations).
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sure at least "the most rudimentary level of due process," the MLB
Commissioner's broad swath of power would seem to cry out for
judicial oversight and intervention. Yet, judicial deference is more
often the response.
The bald reality, as exposed by the baseball cases, that many of
the laws and legal safeguards that apply to the majority of society
simply do not apply to MLB, registered some unease in the Atlanta
court but apparently not enough to cause it to rethink its holding:
"The court therefore concludes, with some misgivings, that under
this provision, the Commissioner did have the authority to punish
plaintiffs."'18 7 Why federal courts time and again defer to MLB even
in the face of precedent that requires them to slalom through their
reading of the law in order to reach their desired outcomes is, per-
haps, not clear on the surface; maybe it is not even clear to these
courts themselves. Rather, the rationale rests within a notion that
has become so ingrained in the American subconscious that it is
most likely driving these decisions from the backseat - not in the
face of the decision makers, but a forceful presence nonetheless.
Very likely it is an even more forceful presence because it is beneath
the surface, lingering and nagging at every turn. It is the concept
of baseball as something greater, something transcendent, some-
thing that speaks to the soul of America. Something that would be
sullied if forced to comply with the mundane concepts of due pro-
cess and other legal niceties. Something that has convinced a large
swath of Americans that its very status as our national symbol justi-
fies its treatment in the most un-American of ways.
187. See id. at 1422 (noting how Atlanta court did step in with regard to power
of MLB's Commissioner to issue sanctions, holding that he may not impose sanc-
tion not explicitly enumerated within Major League Agreement). As such, the
court held that Kuhn's denial of Brave's first round draft choice was improper
because denial of draft choice is not enumerated within list of possible sanctions
within Major League Agreement. See id. Specifically, Article I, section 3 lists puni-
tive measures Commissioner may take as (a) reprimand; (b) deprivation of Major
League Club of representation in joint meetings; (c) suspension or removal of any
officer or employee of Major League or Major League Club; (d) temporary or
permanent ineligibility of player; and (e) fine, not to exceed $5,000 for Major
League Clubs and not to exceed $500 for any officer, employee or player. See
Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1225 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (explaining Atlanta court held that neither Landis nor Finley courts had
ruled on issue and reasoned "in light of the fact that this contract purports to
authorize the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture, it must be strictly construed").
The limitation on Commissioner's powers is quite minor when compared with
seemingly unfettered ability he has to take action pursuant to his "best interests"
clause, as would be later demonstrated to devastating effect in 1989 Pete Rose
scandal. Id.
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V. SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXTRA-LEGAL STATUS OF MLB
Because of the widespread acceptance of the cultural fiction of
the baseball creed, as well as its treatment by the courts, baseball
has, through the course of the twentieth century, become what it
was touted to be a century earlier: something greater than merely a
game, something that transcends everyday life and something
which, therefore, is justifiably treated with kid gloves by the Ameri-
can legal system. This special treatment, through the antitrust ex-
emption as well as the deference paid to MLB's Commissioner,
repeatedly heightened the pedestal upon which the game stood
such that, in circular fashion, with each act of judicial deference,
the exalted status of the game became more and more ingrained.
In fact, by the middle of the twentieth century, the game had
become something much more to many Americans: it had become
as close to a national religion as this country was ever going to get.
One sociologist referred to it as a "civil religion."188 "By civil relig-
ion," he wrote, "I refer to that religious dimension, found I think in
the life of every people, through which it interprets its historical
experience in the light of transcendent reality."18 9 Once the anal-
ogy had been made, the comparisons between the two became obvi-
ous to anyone wishing to make the connection: the ballparks were
referred to as "green cathedrals" and spoken about in reverent
tones with, in the words of one believer in the church of baseball,
"the awe generally reserved for the great cathedrals of Europe."
Even rickety, minor league ballparks, replete with inadequate
plumbing, peeling paint and overrun with rodents, were thought of
as "somebody's place of worship." 190 The Sporting News, which for
years was devoted to baseball primarily and other sports only when
space permitted, gained the moniker of "baseball's bible." Albert
Spalding, the nineteenth century player and sporting goods mag-
nate who brought the game to many parts of the world through his
barnstorming world tour of Major League players during the winter
of 1888, became "the baseball messiah."'19 1 Of course, every relig-
ion requires a spiritual center and baseball was no different. The
188. ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN
TIME OF TRIAL 3 (2d ed., University of Chicago Press 1992) (arguing baseball had
become "national religion").
189. Id.
190. Roberta Newman, The American Church of Baseball and the National Baseball
Hall of Fame, 10 NINE: J. BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE 46 (2001) (noting that
America's religiosity should encompass its national pastime, baseball).
191. Id.; see also MARK LAMSTER, SPALDING'S WORLD TOUR: THE Epic ADVEN-
TURE THAT TOOK BASEBALL AROUND THE GLOBE - AND MADE IT AMERICA'S GAME
(PublicAffairs 2006) (explaining Spalding and two baseball teams went on globe-
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National Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, NY (the mythical -
although largely discredited - birthplace of the game) filled that
role admirably with its congregants hoping to make "pilgrimages,"
referred to by some as "sacred journeys," to this baseball "Mecca" at
least once in their lifetimes. 19 2 Given the ready comparisons, it is
no wonder the judicial system has attempted to steer clear of this
quasi-sacred institution whenever possible.
Beyond religion, baseball wore its mythical status well when
presented through literature, as it was used time and again to "ex-
press the psychological nature of American life and its moral pre-
dicament,"193 most notably, although certainly not exclusively, in
Bernard Malamud's "The Natural."'194 Malamud attempted to por-
tray the early and mid-century baseball star as a mythic hero, as-
signing to his protagonist, Roy Hobbs, attributes of real baseball
players. He grounded his story in reality before propelling his read-
ers into a tale that transcends reality, thereby draping his tale, and
the game itself, with mythical, transformative qualities. 195 For in-
stance, the Hobbs character was largely based on the greatest base-
ball star of the first half of the twentieth century, Babe Ruth
(among other similarities he was a pitcher before becoming a slug-
ger and he makes good on a promise to hit a home run for a boy on
his death bed in the hospital). 19 6 Moreover, Hobbs was shot by a
deranged female fan, not unlike Eddie Waitkus in 1949.197 These
"real life" attributes provide a realistic basis for the story which then
dips into the world of romance and fantasy (witness Hobbs's bat,
"Wonder Boy" carved out of a lightning-struck tree; his first game-
winning hit miraculously bringing rain to the parched field; his
team, the "Knights," led by the mythic hero propelled, Arthurian
spanning goodwill tour, endorsed by President Cleveland, to introduce baseball to
world).
192. See Newman, supra note 190, at 51 (defining "pilgrimage" and noting
how certain baseball terms have religious associations).
193. See Peter Carino, History as Myth in Bernard Malamud's 'The Natural,' 14
NINE: J. BASEBALL HIsT. & CULTURE 67, 68 (2005) (quoting Earl R. Wasserman, The
Natural: World Ceres, 9 CENTENNIAL REv. 438-60 (Fall 1965), reprinted in BERNARD
MALAMUND AND THE CRITICS 47 (Leslie A. Field & Joyce W. Field eds., 1970)).
194. BERNARD MALAMUD, THE NATURAL (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1980) (writ-
ing fictional account of relationship between divine intervention and player deter-
mined to "be the best ever").
195. See Carino, supra note 193, at 72-73 (describing qualities of Malamud's
fictional protagonist that appear to be adopted from real-life characteristics of
Babe Ruth).
196. See id. at 72.
197. See id. at 73.
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style, by his Excalibur-like bat, and on and on).198 These elements
work "reciprocally to add an element of reality to myth and an ele-
ment of myth to history."199 In the end, the message is clear: base-
ball is a medium that transcends the everyday. Just as it would
appear unseemly to require King Arthur to show two forms of iden-
tification before purchasing a pint of ale, it likewise feels wrong to
require baseball's Commissioner to hold a full and fair hearing
before banishing someone from the game.
The link between baseball and "American-ness" even extends,
naturally enough, to the White House where the link between the
two is forced, but nonetheless stressed. One need look no further
than the official White House web site to see a story focusing on the
alleged tale of George Washington playing an early version of the
game on the fields of Valley Forge.2 00 This link has been exploited
for as long as both institutions have been around. President Her-
bert Hoover once quipped that "[n] ext to religion, baseball has fur-
nished a greater impact on American life than any other
institution. '"2 0 1 During times of national crises, baseball has been
used to rally the country, as evidenced by President Franklin
Roosevelt's "green light letter," in which he gave his blessing for the
game to continue through World War II. Roosevelt commented, "I
honestly feel that it would be best for the country to keep baseball
going."20 2 The national interest was not similarly considered with
regard to football.
Despite popular sentiment to the contrary that football has
now usurped baseball in both popularity and connection to the na-
tional spirit, recent evidence shows that this is hardly the case. In
the 2004 presidential election, Democratic nominee (and Massa-
chusetts senator) John Kerry blundered when he stated that his fa-
vorite player on his favorite team was "Manny Ortez" - a bungled
confabulation of the two Red Sox stars Manny Ramirez and David
Ortiz.20 3 George W. Bush, who previously proclaimed that there
were two sacred places on American soil: The White House and
198. See id. at 69.
199. Id.
200. See Baseball at the White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/baseball/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (illustrating how baseball is deeply rooted in American
history and strongly connected to patriotism).
201. Joshua Fleer, The Church of Baseball and the U.S. Presidency, 16 NINE: J.
BASEBALL HIST. & CULTURE 51, 52 (2007) (examining confluence of religion and
Presidency and questioning whether non-baseball fan could ever be elected
President).
202. Id. at 53-54.
203. See id. at 55.
41
Nathanson: The Sovereign Nation of Baseball: Why Federal Law Does Not Apply
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
90 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Yankee Stadium,20 4 pounced, using Kerry's blunder to portray him
as out of touch with the soul of America. 20 5 A similar gaffe with
regard to Kerry's favorite players on the New England Patriots
would most likely have had little political and symbolic value. To
many Americans, baseball is representative of something deeper.
The baseball creed has succeeded in worming itself into the fabric
of America, to the point where the game is seen as central to our
shared, core American values. As such, it only makes sense that, all
realities aside, baseball be afforded an exalted place in our society
and, therefore, our legal system.
VI. BANISHMENT AND PETE ROSE: THE DANGERS OF EXTRA-LEGAL
STATUS ON DISPLAY
As a general notion, those who argue for the self-regulation of
all sports, at least to a degree, base their arguments on the theory
that because sporting events depend on both the actual and appar-
ent honesty and integrity of the competition, an internal system
must be in place that is able to dole out 'justice" quickly and firmly.
Because time is of the essence, and even a waft of corruption or foul
play can be enough to taint an entire league, reliance on the judi-
cial system, with its formal procedural rules and multiple layers of
appeal, is considered inappropriate. Integrity must be kept intact
and this can only be done if action is taken swiftly and severely. 20 6
Given the connection between baseball and America, this argument
only resonates more strongly with regard to MLB. As such, banish-
ment, "the ultimate sanction," is seen as a necessary and just re-
sponse to certain "crimes" committed according to the internal
social, political and legal standards of those who oversee the game
(as opposed to the external, formal legal standards that govern the
rest of society).207 Banishment, however, affects the victim in ways
that extend beyond the games themselves. As a result, courts' def-
erence to professional sports leagues (most notably MLB, where the
deference is most pronounced) in decisions and procedures with
regard to banishment raises legal issues that are all too often ig-
nored in the rush to protect the "integrity of the game." Commis-
204. See id. at 56.
205. See id. at 55.
206. See Durney, supra note 62, at 623 (explaining single party can substan-
tially hurt baseball's self-governing disciplinary system with one successful suit and
MLB has vested interest prevention).
207. Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment As Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal
Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REv. 85, 88 (2007) (reflecting paradigm of tribal justice
structure of Native Americans needs to change to protect individual rights)
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sioner Landis's expulsion of the Black Sox in 1922 most famously
displayed these banishment issues, but the same issues have reap-
peared several times since then.
In 1970, for example, Commissioner Kuhn indefinitely sus-
pended Detroit Tigers pitcher Denny McLain for associating with
gamblers. 20 8 Although McLain was never convicted, charged with a
crime, or even accused of throwing a game, Kuhn doled out 'jus-
tice" nevertheless. After conducting an internal investigation Kuhn
amended McLain's suspension to a three-month ban, which itself
was derided by many as being much too lenient, regardless of the
reality that McLain had seemingly violated no law yet was being
punished through the denial of a property interest (his salary) any-
way.209 Newsweek lamented that "baseball, like all sports, is a very
special segment of that society - one that depends for its very exis-
tence on the complete confidence of the public. McLain shook
that confidence as badly as anyone in the last 50 years, and Kuhn's
action last week compounded the error."210 To many, Kuhn's sen-
tence violated their sense of justice - not of the legal variety - but
one emanating from somewhere else entirely; a higher sense, one
which MLB was expected to dole out in order to protect the integ-
rity of the game and, therefore, the American soul.21 1 Saddled with
this responsibility, and empowered by the legal system to seemingly
act unchecked, it is little wonder that a culture of corruption would
eventually set in as a sense of entitlement and indifference to the
rule of law and to the societal boundaries of acceptable conduct
became ingrained within MLB. All of this would be on display in
the Pete Rose affair. And from the Rose affair, it certainly was a
short trip to the Enron-like system of corruption exposed by the
December, 2007 release of the Mitchell Report.
As the generation that could recall the Black Sox scandal died
out, successive generations would receive their own lesson of base-
ball justice through the Rose affair, which in many ways was Black
Sox redux. 212 By the late 1980's, however, there was over sixty years
of precedent for MLB's exertion of extra-legal authority. As such,
the abuse of Rose's rights was far more blatant. Nevertheless, these
abuses were easily brushed off by an organization which, by this
208. See Nathan, supra note 47, at 136-38.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 137-38.
211. See id. at 137.
212. See id. at 185.
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point, was confident that the federal legal system was highly un-
likely to step in and challenge its authority.
The facts of the Rose case were relatively straightforward. In
1985 and 1986, Rose, who at the time was managing the Cincinnati
Reds (the beneficiaries of the thrown 1919 World Series), was al-
leged to have placed a series of wagers on 390 Major League games
including 52 involving his Reds. 213 Betting sheets were uncovered,
complete with Rose's fingerprints, along with the betting records of
Rose's bookies, including one of Ron Peters, a bookmaker from
suburban Cincinnati. 214 If proven, this activity would violate Base-
ball Rule 21 (d) which forbids any player, umpire, club or league
official or employee from betting on any baseball game. If the
game was one in which the bettor had no connection, the penalty is
a one-year suspension; if, however, the game was one in which the
bettor "has a duty to perform," the penalty would be the ultimate
sanction: permanent banishment from the game. 215 Upon receipt
of this information, Commissioner Peter Ueberroth invoked his
power to investigate and, in February 1989, hired John M. Dowd to
conduct an inquiry into the allegations.21 6 On April 1, 1989, Bart A.
Giamatti succeeded Ueberroth as Commissioner and the investiga-
tion continued with Dowd focusing on the bookies, particularly
Ron Peters, who was staring down federal charges of cocaine distri-
bution and tax evasion and who was, therefore, in a vulnerable posi-
tion himself.21 7 In order to coax out his testimony, Dowd informed
Peters that, in exchange for his "full and truthful cooperation with
the Commissioner," Giamatti would agree to bring to the attention
of Peters' Federal District Court judge the fact that Peters was "of
assistance to us and that we believe that you have been honest and
complete in your cooperation." 218 Peters agreed and then impli-
cated Rose. Thereafter, Giamatti wrote to U.S. District CourtJudge
Carl Rubin: "It is my purpose to bring to your attention the signifi-
cant and truthful cooperation Mr. Peters has provided to my special
counsel .... Based upon other information in our possession, I am
213. See Klein, supra note 88, at 570.
214. See id.
215. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Pete Rose, Bart Giamatti, and the Dowd Report, 68
Miss. LJ. 889, 891 (1999) (examining Pete Rose's permanent suspension from
MLB for betting on baseball).
216. See Klein, supra note 88, at 575-76.
217. See id.
218. Id.
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satisfied Mr. Peters has been candid, forthright and truthful with
my special counsel."
219
Rose took exception to Giamatti's letter, alleging that it consti-
tuted evidence that Giamatti had prejudged the case, given that,
prior to the hearing and the introduction of Rose's evidence in de-
fense of the charges against him, Giamatti had apparently already
concluded that the chief witness against him, Ron Peters, had been
"candid, forthright and truthful.", Rose claimed that his upcoming
hearing was little more than window dressing, as his fate had al-
ready been determined. Therefore, he sued Giamatti in state court
to prevent the hearing from going forward. Rose based his suit on
several theories, the most pertinent of which drew from the dicta in
Finley and was based on a breach of contract theory where he
claimed that Giamatti was contractually bound to conduct his hear-
ing in accordance with the Rules of Procedure contained within the
Major League Agreement which stated that such proceedings
should be run "in general like judicial proceedings. '" 220 He also al-
leged that the procedures he was to be subject to prevented him
from properly confronting his accusers and from cross-examining
them (particularly those named within what became known as the
"Dowd Report").221 Rose's claim echoed the court in Pro Sports Ltd.
by raising substantive and procedural due process issues, claiming
that public policy, as well as Ohio law, required "reasonable notice
and a hearing with a fair opportunity to defend the charges."
22 2
Finally, he called on Giamatti to recuse himself from the proceed-
ing, given his biased opinion as expressed in his letter to Judge
Rubin.223
Wisely, Rose filed his case in state, rather than in federal, court.
As such, without the history of deference behind it, he stood a bet-
ter chance of at least having his voice heard. In June of 1989, the
state court granted his motion for a temporary restraining order,
holding that despite the legal system's tradition of deference to
MLB, here, there was no choice but to step in, given the strong
likelihood that Giamatti had prejudged Rose's case and that the
subsequent hearing would be "futile, illusory, and the outcome a
219. Id. at 576.
220. Id. at 580-81 (discussing Rules of Procedure contained within Major
League Agreement); see also Rose v. Giamatti, 1989 WL 111386 (Ohio Com. P1.
1989).
221. See Klein, supra note 88, at 580-81.
222. Durney, supra note 62, at 592.
223. See Klein, supra note 88, at 580-81.
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foregone conclusion."224 MLB, however, removed the case to fed-
eral court where the Sixth Circuit eventually denied Rose's objec-
tion to the removal, thereby setting into motion the process for the
"futile, illusory" hearing that could now finally take place.22 5 Al-
though Rose had one formal legal avenue still open to him - a
hearing on his motion for a permanent injunction against Giamatti,
albeit this time in federal, rather than state, court - Federal District
CourtJudge John D. Holschuh strongly hinted that he would abide
by tradition and defer to the substantive and procedural rules as
defined by MLB, irrespective of how it chose to implement them. 226
With state court closed off to him and the federal court clearly hint-
ing that it would provide him no relief, Rose was effectively at the
mercy of Giamatti. Therefore, on August 23, 1989, Rose consented
to his permanent banishment from the game, signing a document
in which he "recognize[d], agree[d] and submit[ted] to the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner" to hear and deter-
mine this matter, as well as any other determined by the Commis-
sioner to be "not in the best interests of the national game of
baseball."2 27 In the end, despite the absence of a formal finding
that Rose bet on baseball, let alone his Reds, and without so much
as even the "futile and illusory" hearing contemplated by the Ohio
state court, Rose was banished for life.
The agreement did toss Rose a couple of bones. Although it
was technically a "permanent" banishment, it provided for the pos-
sibility of his reinstatement after one year.22 8 More importantly,
and perhaps a nod to the denial of due process and lack of a hear-
ing prior to banishment, it contained the following language:
"[n] othing in this agreement shall be deemed either an admission
or a denial by Peter Edward Rose of the allegation that he bet on
any major league baseball game." 229 Combined, these two apparent
concessions by MLB seemingly paved the path for Rose's eventual
return to the game; as such, they most likely contributed to his as-
sent to the agreement and his dropping of the legal case, regardless
of the ultimate futility of his pressing onward. Now, pursuant to the
224. Murray Chase, Judge Blocks Giamatti's Hearing on Betting Charges Against
Rose, N. Y. TIMES, June 26, 1989, at Al (discussing Judge's decision to prevent Gia-
matti from holding hearing on Rose charges).
225. See Klein, supra note 88, at 583-84.
226. See Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 916-19 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (examin-
ing the citizenship for jurisdictional purposes of unincorporated MLB).
227. Klein, supra note 88, at 586.
228. Id.
229. Rychlak, supra note 215, at 895.
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terms of the agreement, Rose could see his way out of the forest,
however, almost immediately MLB made it very clear that any such
path was illusory.
Upon the announcement of the agreement, Giamatti stated
that irrespective of the language agreed upon by both he and Rose,
he believed that Rose had bet on baseball. 230 Instantly, for all prac-
tical purposes, the terms of the agreement had been changed uni-
laterally by MLB - in order to successfully apply for reinstatement,
Rose would most likely have to admit that he bet on baseball. This
was something that was not contemplated by the agreement and
added yet another layer of injustice to MLB's handling of the Rose
affair: not only was banishment carried out in the absence of a hear-
ing and in the absence of due process, but both the banishment
agreement, as well as the terms of reinstatement, were altered uni-
laterally and after the fact. To further complicate matters, eight
days later, Giamatti died of a heart attack, thereby sealing Rose's
fate. 231 At this point it was extremely unlikely that future Commis-
sioners were going to take steps to undo the agreement of their
predecessor, an individual immensely admired. This was made ex-
plicit in 1995 when (then acting) Commissioner Selig stated that he
would not revisit Rose's banishment because "Bart Giamatti was one
of the best friends I've ever had in the world, and I have great faith
in his decision. His decision still stands, and as far as I'm con-
cerned, his decision should stand."232 Legal niceties and issues of
fundamental fairness were not the issue in Selig's eyes. Instead, it
was the reputation of a friend that hung in the balance.
Taken together, the many stages of the Rose affair, as well as its
ultimate resolution, are indicative of a system embracing the rule of
man rather than the rule of law - the polar opposite of the princi-
ple upon which the American legal system allegedly rests. Yet some-
how, despite the reality that baseball has been governed in such
fashion since the days of Judge Landis, it is still seen as symbolic of
America. If so, this raises serious questions about what this says
about both institutions. Rose's case illustrates that even the most
basic concessions to the applicability of the rule of law as outlined
230. See id. During the question and answer session of the announcement of
the agreement between MLB and Rose, Giamatti's response to the first question
posed to him ("Did Rose bet on Baseball?") was: "In the absence of a hearing and
therefore in the absence of evidence to the contrary .... I am confronted by the
factual record of Mr. Dowd. On the basis of that, yes, I have concluded that he bet
on baseball." Id.
231. See NATHAN, supra note 52, at 187.
232. See Rychlak, supra note 215, at 900.
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in Finley were little more than dicta. When they stood in the way of
"baseball justice" they were to be pushed to the side as well. Finley's
two-pronged test regarding the Major League Agreement's waiver
of recourse to the courts called for judicial intervention when the
Commissioner does not follow baseball's internal rules or when he
violates the basic rudiments of due process of law.233 Giamatti vio-
lated both prongs of the Finley test yet Federal District Court Judge
John D. Holschuh strongly hinted that this was of little matter as he
was prepared to defer to Giamatti regardless.
Giamatti, like Landis before him, initiated and presided over
an affair where he was the investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury,
acting in so many different capacities so as to exceed, at least ac-
cording to Finley, even the broad powers granted him within the
Major League Agreement. Outside of the context of MLB, courts
have held that such a concentration of power in one office raises
serious concerns, as there exists an obvious potential for abuse. 234
On top of this, the fact that the decisions made by this powerful
individual are not subject to judicial review absent extraordinary
circumstances is likewise a factor that, in non-MLB contexts, has
caused concern by several courts, including the Supreme Court.23 5
The institutionalized, structural biases inherent in such a system -
one in which there appears to be no restraint upon a Commissioner
to punish people without proper review and safeguards, as well as
one in which the Commissioner himself is free to set forth the rules
of procedure which he will then follow (or not, as the Rose affair
demonstrated) - are obvious and odious.236 Yet the judicial system
continues to defer.
In the absence of a judicial check, a culture of abuse was al-
lowed to fester as MLB was free to conduct its affairs however it
233. Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 550 (7th Cir. 1978).
234. See Durney, supra note 62, at 609-10; see also Auto. Serv. Councils of Mich.
v. Sec'y of State, 267 N.W. 2d 698, 705 (Mich. App. 1978) ("The danger of unfair-
ness is particularly great in an agency in which there is a high degree of concentra-
tion of both prosecuting and judicial functions, especially where the functions are
combined in the same men. The courts have pointed out that in such situations
the agency members must be zealous in the recognition and preservation of the
right to a hearing by impartial triers of the facts, and such fusion of functions has
been subjected to considerable criticism." Id. (quoting 1 AM. JUR. 2D. Administra-
tive Law § 78)).
235. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145(1968) (holding United States Arbitration Act allows removal of arbitration award
when arbitrator found to be partial). "We should.., be even more scrupulous to
safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators... since [they] have completely free rein
to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review." Id. at
149.
236. See Durney, supra note 62, at 610-11.
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pleased in order to achieve other goals. In Rose's case, as in the
case of the Black Sox, it was to protect the image of the game, to
present it as one with its integrity intact despite the actions of al-
leged outliers such as Rose and the 1919 White Sox. The prospect
of a full and fair investigation and resulting hearing, complete with
the possibility of exoneration of the suspects, was something MLB
was not willing to risk, particularly when it did not have to, given its
elevated role within American society which made judicial interfer-
ence highly unlikely.
VII. CONCLUSION
After the Rose affair, the extra-legal status of Major League
Baseball was more assured than ever. Accordingly, MLB was free to
establish its own rules and then break them whenever and however
it wished, federal law notwithstanding. In this environment, it is
not surprising that suspicion and evidence regarding illegal drug
and steroid use was ignored throughout the 1980s, '90s and '00s,
particularly when acknowledgment of such abuses would likely
dampen enthusiasm for the game and threaten its integrity as an
untarnished sport and an emblem of American values. This pres-
sure became increasingly acute after the labor unrest and resulting
work stoppage, which wiped out the 1994 World Series and dam-
aged the popularity of the game. Upon its return in 1995, baseball
was looking for a return to its exalted status, much as it was in the
wake of the Black Sox scandal. Eventually, it found the path
through power hitters such as Mark McGwire, Sammy Sosa and
Barry Bonds, who threatened home run records and brought peo-
ple back to the game, just as Babe Ruth had in the early 1920's. As
pitcher Greg Maddux said in a promotional spot for MLB at the
time, "chicks dig the long ball." Without the threat of legal action
hanging over its head for non-compliance with existing federal law,
MLB had no incentive to comply with it and every incentive to ig-
nore it, blissfully and willfully. As a result, players got bigger and
home run records that had stood unchallenged for decades were
smashed and then smashed again as the baseball record book was
rewritten with each passing season. In its considered ignorance,
MLB encouraged the culture of corruption that emerged in team
clubhouses throughout the league and profited from it both in
terms of dollars and status. The Mitchell Report exposed it, but,
despite the machinations of Selig to deflect attention away from
MLB and onto players such as Barry Bonds, the exposure was not in
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the form of a w;ndow into the secret workings of a Major League
locker room, but instead, that of a mirror, where what was exposed
was merely a reflection of the inner workings of MLB itself.
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